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AVIATION SECURITY AND PAN AM FLIGHT 103:
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?*
NANCY JEAN STRANTZ**
I. INTRODUCTION
HAT CHANGE comes more readily from desperation
than inspiration has never been more evident than in
the case of the Pan American World Airways Flight 103
(Pan Am Flight 103), which blew up over Lockerbie, Scot-
land on December 21, 1988. The lives of two hundred
forty-three passengers and sixteen crew members were
lost.
This article is about the ill-fated Pan Am Flight 103 and
of the changes that have followed it. These changes are,
by no means, complete. Pan Am Flight 103 has been the
catalyst for several bills (House bills for the proposed Air-
port Technology and Research Act of 1989 and the pro-
posed Aviation Security Act of 1989 and companion
House and Senate bills for the proposed Aviation Security
Improvement Act of 1990') and continues to indirectly af-
* The legislation and information discussed in this article reflects sources as of
Oct. 19, 1990.
** The author is a recent graduate of South Texas College of Law (Spring
1990) and holds a LLB. degree from the University of Alberta (1981). She has
practiced law in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, both as a private practitioner and as in-
house counsel with a major Canadian oil and gas company. She has also co-au-
thored a reference guide on Canadian hardrock mining legislation.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance and support of the following:
Mr. Myron P. Papadakis, Mr. Charles Weigel, III, and Ms. Ursula Weigold (South
Texas College of Law) and Mr. Joe Feathers (Senate Document Room).
I Airport Security Technology and Research Act, H.R. 2365, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 135 CONG. REC. H5881 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989) [hereinafter Airport Tech-
nology and Research Act]; Aviation Security Act, H.R. 1659, 101st Cong., 1st
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fect federal transportation appropriations and budgets.2
The Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy has also rekindled the de-
bate over reform of the international Warsaw Conven-
tion,3 and is responsible for administrative reorganization
within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to in-
crease domestic government accountability. The degree
of public involvement in aviation security is also begin-
ning to change as the living victims of Pan Am Flight 103
(the friends and family of those who died) persist in their
efforts to make airlines warn passengers of credible bomb
threats.
In a broader sense, Pan Am Flight 103 is a lesson in
law-making: a case study of how the human element is
easily lost in hearings, budget debates, and cost-benefit
analyses. The resulting legislative initiatives expose our
predisposition to dogmatic reliance on technology, de-
spite glaring deficiencies and exorbitant price tags. Most
importantly, Pan Am Flight 103 is, for those who listen, a
caution against the very thing that made the tragedy at
Lockerbie possible: the abdication of personal responsi-
bility in favor of government "protection."
II. PAN AM FLIGHT 103: THE HORROR
Pan Am Flight 103 originated in Frankfurt, West Ger-
many. It departed Frankfurt at 4:54 p.m. on Wednesday,
December 21, 1988. At London's Heathrow Airport, the
jet made a routine stop to take on more passengers des-
tined for New York City's Kennedy Airport. At 6:25 p.m.,
the flight departed London. Only thirty-nine minutes
Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Aviation Security Act]; Aviation Security Improvement
Act, H.R. 5200, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H8469 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1990) [hereinafter House Aviation Security Improvement Act]; S. 2822, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (companion bill
to H.R. 5200) [hereinafter Aviation Security Improvement Senate Companion
Bill].
2 For a discussion of funding issues, see infra notes 169-218 and accompanying
text.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted following 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988).
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later,4 over the small Scottish town of Lockerbie just
twenty-four miles from the English border, the jet ex-
ploded. During descent and upon impact, the wreckage
destroyed a dozen homes, killing eleven of Lockerbie's es-
timated 2500 residents. Exploding aviation fuel threw a
300 foot fireball skyward, leaving behind a scar on the
earth twenty feet deep.5 Wreckage and body parts were
strewn over a vast area of soggy Scottish countryside.6 In
a matter of minutes, Pan Am Flight 103 became both the
"worst air disaster in British history' 7 and the highest fa-
tality aviation incident in American history.
As is typical in an aircraft explosion, Pan Am Flight
103's crew sent no distress signal before the crash.8 The
emanation of a strange orangy-yellow glow in the sky and
the wide distribution of debris indicated the plane came
apart before ground impact,9 leading to immediate specu-
lation that the flight had been sabotaged. It is now virtu-
ally certain that a bomb, concealed in a Toshiba radio-
cassette recorder and hidden in a suitcase, caused the
explosion. 0
4 Reports of the exact time vary. D. JOHNSTON, LOCKERBIE: THE TRAGEDY OF
FLIGHT 103, at 230-31 (1989); Phillips, A Doomed Flight Home, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 2,
1989, at 46; Platt, The Warnings That Weren't; New Revelations About the Tragedy of Pan
Am 103, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1989, at 30.
D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 7.
Wreckage from the airplane was scattered over 845 square miles. British Gov-
ernment's Report on Pan Am 103 Bombing Suggests Toughening Aircraft Structure and Sys-
tems, AIR SAFETY WEEK, Sept. 17, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter British Report]. Winds
carried some debris as far as the coast of England. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM (May 15, 1990) [hereinafter PRES-
IDENT'S COMM'N REPORT].
I D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 63 (noting statements by British Transport Sec-
retary Paul Channon).
8 Hughes, Safety Experts Cite Similarities Between DC-8, 747 Crashes, 130 Avi. WEEK
& SPACE TECH., Feb. 6, 1989, at 58. However, on September 11, 1990, the British
Transport Department's Air Accidents Investigation Branch released a report say-
ing the digital flight recorder on Flight 103 made no record of the explosion, but
simply stopped at 19:02:50 with "a sudden, loud sound," which could have either
been from the explosion, or from the sudden destruction of the plane. The report
recommends manufacturing improvements for aircraft digital flight (data) record-
ers and cockpit voice recorders to ensure data recovery after power or pressure
loss. See BRITISH REPORT, supra note 6, at 1-2.
9 Hughes, supra note 8, at 58.
10 On December 28, 1988, the Department of Transport announced traces of
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Investigation by Scottish, British, West German, and
United States authorities determined that the bomb's det-
onator and timing device were probably made near Da-
mascus, Syria by or for the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)."
The Semtex plastic explosive most likely originated in
Krusevac, Yugoslavia not far from the Bulgarian border.
These components were smuggled into Frankfurt and
later assembled and fitted into a Toshiba radio-cassette
recorder, probably by a known Palestinian bombmaker or
by Libyan intelligence agents paid by the PFLP-GC. t 2
The bomb was transported to Sliema, Malta and stuffed
into a copper-colored suitcase destined for Frankfurt via
Air Malta Flight KM180. In Frankfurt, it was transferred
to the Boeing 727 that would fly the first leg of Pan Am
Flight 103 to London, England. At Heathrow Airport, the
bag was transferred either interline or by passenger' 3 to
explosives had been found in the wreckage. Airports, Airlines Tighten Security as
Probers Cite Bomb in Pan Am Crash, AIR SAFETY L. & TECH., Jan. 10, 1989, at 2; see
also Duffy, On the Trail of Terror, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 1989, at 44.
On September 11, 1990, Britain's Civil Aviation Authority reported its findings
that an improvised bomb in the jet's left forward cargo hold exploded at 9500
meters, producing a large hole in the fuselage structure and buckling the main
cabin floor. The pressure differential propagated large cracks running outward
from the hole. With the explosion, the structural identity of the fuselage was de-
stroyed. Consequently, the nose and flight deck area separated from the jet
within seconds, and the remaining portions of the aircraft disintegrated on de-
scent. Build Bomb-Proof Planes, Lockerbie Report Says, Calgary Herald, Sept. 12, 1990,
at AI6, col. 1; British Report, supra note 6, at 2.
iI Duffy, supra note 10, at 44-46; Frontline: The Bombing of Pan Am 103 (WGBH-
TV television broadcast, Jan. 23, 1990) (transcript on file at office of Journal of Air
Law & Commerce; Frontline: Tracking the Pan Am Bombers (WGBH-TV television
broadcast, Nov. 28, 1989) (transcript on file at office of Journal of Air Law & Com-
merce); D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 101-16, 143-63,
12 Frontline: Tracking the Pan Am Bombers, supra note 11. Wines, New Lockerbie Evi-
dence Involves Libya, Tampa Tribune, Oct. 10, 1990, at BI, col. 1.
13 The term "interline" refers to baggage transfer at an airport directly between
air carriers. Some uncertainly exists as to whether the suitcase could have been
placed on the plane by someone with access to the baggage compartment, but
most accounts assume the bomb entered the baggage system via an unsuspecting
passenger. See D.JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at Postscript; Duffy, supra note 10. New
evidence suggests a man may have unknowingly had the suitcase he was carrying
in connection with a DEA operation exchanged with the suitcase containing the
bomb. Calgary Newshour (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 31, 1990).
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The investigation of the Pam Am Flight 103 disaster has
resulted in a frenzy of finger-pointing and speculation.
Complaints range from the lack of airport security in
Frankfurt to the lack of compassion shown by United
States officials toward both the dead and their families.
Adding to the distrust and confusion is evidence that
there were certainly two and possibly seven or eight Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents aboard the second
leg of Pan Am Flight 103.14 Heroin was discovered
among the wreckage, and large amounts of currency were
reportedly found blowing around the Scottish countryside
after the crash.1 5
The estates of the deceased have filed, lawsuits against
Pan Am claiming millions of dollars in damages. The
cases were consolidated for pretrial discovery and liability
trial.16 Once these phases of the litigation are completed,
and if liability is established, the remaining issue of dam-
ages in individual cases will be determined either through
trial or by settlement.' 7 The pleadings allege that Pan Am
failed to warn passengers of a bomb threat of which the
airline had notice, was derelict in the retention, supervi-
sion, and training of its personnel and contractors with
respect to security and operations, and did not ticket,
monitor, board, maintain, and otherwise secure the air-
craft so as to prevent its destruction. Pan Am, in turn, has
subpoenaed at least six United States Government depart-
14 D.JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 68-77; telephone interview with Georgia Nucci,
Director, "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103," Claverack, N. Y. (Feb. 2, 1990).
'5 D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 79; telephone interview, supra note 14.
16 In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland, No. MDL 799 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1990)
(1990 WESTLAW 29764).
17 Telephone interview with Michael Baumeister, Baumeister and Samuels,
Member of Plaintiffs' Committee for In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland, New
York, N. Y., (Sept. 21, 1990).
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ments, including the CIA, the State Department, and the
Drug Enforcement Administration.'"
Some plaintiffs likely considered legal action against the
United States Government for its failure to warn passen-
gers of a bomb threat but found they were probably
barred by the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA).9 In or-
der to recover in a tort action, this statute requires the
plaintiffs prove that the negligence occurred in the
United States.2 ' For example, the FAA would have to be
sued for its failure to require the airline to warn passen-
gers or for its own failure to warn passengers of threats to
security. The plaintiffs also would have to prove such fail-
ure to warn was not part of the FAA's "discretionary func-
tion.''21  It seems unlikely a plaintiff would succeed
against the government under the FTCA. The adoption
or rejection of policies, rules, or regulations normally falls
within the discretion of the FAA, and as such, the "discre-
tionary function" exception to the FTCA would apply to
bar recovery.
Speculation that Pan Am Flight 103 was actually a drug
run protected by the CIA and DEA in exchange for infor-
mation on hostages held in Iran at the time implicates the
United States Department of State in more serious mal-
feasance than mere negligence.2 2 Depending on the pro-
's Jacoby, Looking for Someone to Blame: Grieving Families Gear Up for Legal Battle,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1989, at 34; Shapiro, Pan Am Liability Insurer Sets $60 Million
Reserve, Bus. INS., Jan. 16, 1989, at 2, 44.
,9 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1988).
20 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, Aviation Tort Law § 15:9 (1979). For example, the
FAA in Washington would have to be sued for negligence in failing to require the
airline to warn passengers or for its own failure to warn passengers of threats to
security. See id.
21 Id.
' D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 79-80; Ludtke, Keeping Lockerbie Alive: Questions
Still Burn for Relatives of the Pan Am 103 Victims, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 33; Tele-
phone interview, supra note 14; Calgary Newshour, supra note 13. A Pittsburgh in-
vestigative reporter is said to be taking legal action in an attempt to force United
States government agencies to release more information on the events surround-
ing the Pam Am disaster. Telephone interview with Kevin Bell, reporter, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 1990). This would not be the first time accusations of
government conspiracy have been made. The December 1985 Gander, New-
foundland crash is thought to have been related to the Iran-Contra affair. See Bell,
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nouncement as to the outcome of the criminal
investigation of the Scottish Lord Advocate,23 a Pandora's
box of problems may still await both the State Depart-
ment and Pan Am. On September 30, 1990, it was re-
ported in London, England, that FBI blunders in the
handling of the case may mean a guilty party may never be
identified.24 A British judicial inquiry into the handling of
the case was scheduled for October 1, 1990.25
Aside from the domestic liability issues, if the guilty
party is ever identified, international political repercus-
sions will likely follow. These repercussions could be
complex, particularly if the bombing was inspired or given
assistance by the governments of Iran, Syria, or Egypt.26
All receive support from the Soviet Union. If criminal
indictments are handed down by the Scottish Lord Advo-
cate and the United States commences extradition pro-
ceedings, international negotiators will be grappling with
additional legal issues relating to the availability of the
death penalty in the United States. 7
Also on an international level, the crash has prompted
discussion and debate at the annual Montreal meeting of
Gander Crash Surrounded by Mystery, Thompson News Service, June 18, 1990 release
(unedited version courtesy of Mr. Bell - on file at office of Journal of Air Law &
Commerce).
21 The Scottish Lord Advocate is the rough equivalent of the Solicitor General
in the United States.
24 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation: Radio News (CBC radio broadcast, Sept. 30,
1990).
25 Id.
21, See D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 21, 158-160. It is possible the bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103 was in retaliation for the shooting down of a commercial Ira-
nian airbus over the Strait of Hormuz by the U.S.S. Vincennes on July 3, 1988.
Iran is the stated country of choice of Bert Ammernam, Political Committee
Chairman of "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103." Id.; see also Ludtke, supra note 22;
Frontline: Tracking the Pan Am Bombers, supra note 11. For information on the official
statements on the Iranian airbus tragedy, see 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 38 (1989). For
an overview of possible suspects, see Watson, A Trail of Terror: The Search for the
Bomber Who Knocked Pan Am Flight 103 Out of the Sky, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1989, at 28.
27 The United States is one of the few remaining Western countries to continue
to uphold capital punishment. Eight European countries retain the death penalty,
but five use it only for exceptional crimes like wartime treason. No European
country has executed a prisoner in the last decade. Coleman v. McCormick, 874
F.2d 1280, 1297 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) over
the adequacy of both international airport security and
the relief provided under the Warsaw Convention. 8
B. The "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103"
Although tragedies of this magnitude create their own
impetus for change, another force has kept steady pres-
sure on Pan Am, the United States Government, the FAA,
the American public, and the international aviation com-
munity to prevent repetition of the events of Lockerbie.
On February 19, 1989, families of those who died on Pan
Am Flight 103 formed a support group, "Victims of Pan
Am Flight 103."
The group originally formed to secure the expeditious
return of belongings, obtain answers to questions, and
force a full, independent investigation of the crash.29 The
group's efforts have blossomed into an investigation of all
aspects of air security, both domestic and international.
Labeled "strident" by even its own members,3 0 the group
is both persistent and articulate in its criticism of aviation
security practices. Members have been a forceful pres-
ence at government hearings on aviation security, and are
skillful in obtaining media coverage. They have appeared
on at least five television broadcasts relating to the Pan
Am Flight 103 disaster.
The "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103" has a board of di-
rectors heading four committees. A legal committee ad-
vises the membership about compensation issues and
matters relating to civil and criminal liability. A political
committee has pressed for an independent inquiry into
the Lockerbie tragedy and currently lobbies for legislative
action. The financial committee raises funds and is re-
2m Foreign Airport Security: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1989) (statement of Mr. Braumfield).
2 - D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 132-33.
.11 Donohue: Families of the Victims: Pan Am Flight 103, Lockerbie, Scotland (Mul-
timedia Entertainment Inc. television broadcast Dec. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Dono-
hue] (transcript on file at office of Journal of Air Law & Commerce).
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sponsible for the group's financial records. Ongoing
emotional support for the group is provided by a fourth
committee. Meetings are held regularly, and the group
has its own mailing address and telephone line.
While the legislators initially focused on technological
solutions to problems in aviation security, the "Victims of
Pan Am Flight 103" maintained that additional measures
were needed. The group continues to insist that unless
government becomes actively responsible for passenger
security, passengers deserve the right to be warned of
credible bomb threats so that they may take steps to pro-
tect themselves. Until recently, this proposal has met with
opposition. The group, however, is determined to get an-
swers and results; some members have gone to great
lengths to prove the inadequacy of air security 3 ' As time
passes and the sense of urgency for legislative reform sub-
sides, the role of the "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103" will
become more important in ensuring change takes place.
Fortunately, the "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103" have a
sustained, personal commitment to improved aviation se-
curity. As the president of the group stated during a tele-
vision broadcast, "We've all made a commitment to our
loved ones. And Secretary Baker and President Bush
can't have a higher commitment than I have to my
brother, or 259 other people in our organization have to
their loved ones. And that's why we will succeed. ' 32
it A British father, whose daughter was killed on the ground, smuggled a radio-
cassette tape player onto a London to New York flight in June 1990 to demon-
strate the continuing lack of security and to press for an independent and compre-
hensive investigation in Britain to discover why the Pan Am Flight 103 bomb was
not discovered at Heathrow. The player was filled with three-quarters of a pound
of yellow marzipan, resembling Semtex in appearance and odor, which showed
through the grill and oozed out the back of the player. Although the player was
much heavier than it should have been in normal circumstances, the cassette
passed examination by British airport security personnel. He also claimed to have
carried a similar bomb replica, undetected, through security at the British House
of Commons. Fake Bomb Fools British Airport Security, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July
2, 1990, at A2, col 1.
.12 Donohue, supra note 30, at 2 (statements of Bert Ammerman).
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IV. REFORMS PROMPTED BY PAN AM FLIGHT 103
Of the many aspects of aviation security to which Pan
Am Flight 103 has directed attention, three have far-
reaching legal significance. The first is the recent re-ex-
amination of the proposed reforms to the Warsaw Con-
vention and related compensation plans. The second is
the introduction in 1989 of both the Aviation Airport
Technology and Research Act and the Aviation Security
Act.3 3 The third is the release of a report by the Presi-
dent's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
containing recommendations for reform of the entire avi-
ation security system, and the introduction in 1990 of the
Aviation Security Improvement Act.
A. The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention 4 is an international treaty
governing commercial air travel originally designed to
protect a fledgling airline industry. It eliminated unlim-
ited liability of airline carriers, forcing the passenger to
share some of the risks of air travel, thus providing an en-
vironment more favorable to economic growth of the avi-
ation industry. 5 Proposed in 1929, and agreed to by the
United States in 1934, it is a widely respected treaty. The
Warsaw Convention's primary purpose is uniformity of
aviation law among international states.36
The original convention creates a presumption of air-
line carrier liability, coupled with a ceiling on that liabil-
ity.3 7 Prima facie liability of the carrier is established on
proof of the accident. Thus, plaintiffs suing airline carri-
ers no longer carry the burden of proving the carrier's
negligence; however, the amount of recoverable damages
,' See sources cited supra note 1.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3.
Baumeister, Expanding Concepts of Liability Under the Warsaw Convention, at 3-4
(presented at and reprinted in the materials of the 24th Annual SMU Air Law
Symposium (Journal of Air Law and Commerce), Mar. 2, 1990).
6 Id.
-17 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 17, 20.
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is limited. To rebut the presumption of liability, Article
21 provides for contributory negligence by the passenger
as a partial or absolute defense, dependent on local law.
Article 20 exonerates the carrier from liability if the car-
rier proves it took all necessary measures, or that it was
impossible for the carrier to take such measures, to avoid
the damage.3 8
Modifications contemplated in Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention 39 were introduced by the Montreal Interim
Agreement of 1966 (Montreal Agreement).40 The Mon-
treal Agreement increases the limit of liability of interna-
tional carriers serving the United States to $75,000 per
passenger per incident, unless the airline is found guilty
of willful misconduct or the passenger is found contribu-
torily negligent.4 ' In other words, the Montreal Agree-
ment eliminates the Article 20 defense, shifting the risk of
air travel to the airline carrier, but preserving the original
burden of proof. This change appears reasonable, given
that, since the mid-1960's, air travel has been an economi-
cally viable industry.
As the airline industry has prospered, pressure has
been mounting to eliminate the liability limits altogether.
In 1975, Montreal Protocols Numbers 3 and 4 (Montreal
Protocols) 42 were signed, increasing the personal liability
limits to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights and establishing
a liability limit for cargo equivalent to about $21 per kilo-
gram. Special Drawing Rights are an international mone-
tary unit keyed to the International Monetary Fund,
.4 Id. arts. 20, 21.
39 Id. art. 22. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides for a special con-
tract between the carrier and the United States on behalf of its citizens to increase
the liability limits. Baumeister, supra note 35, at 5.
40 Annotation, Liability Under Warsaw Convention (49 Stat. 3000 et. seq.) of Interna-
tional Air Carrier for Death or Injury of Passenger Sustained in Aitport Terminal During
Course of Terrorist Attack, 36 A.L.R. FED. 490, 495 (1978).
4 Annotation, supra note 40, at 495; Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 20,
21.
42 See Annotation, supra note 40, at 495; see also Aldred, Pan Am Crash Imperils OK
for New Liability Cap, Bus. INS., Mar. 27, 1989, at 1, 28.
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equivalent in early 1990 to about $1.36. The purpose of
this monetary unit is to eliminate the volatility in the
amount of the liability limits under the Warsaw Conven-
tion and Montreal Agreement, which are now based on
the price of gold.
The United States Department of Transportation
(DOT) has been seeking the ratification of the Montreal
Protocols since 1975 and, as contemplated therein, has
proposed several supplemental compensation plans. In
March 1983, the United States Senate voted in favor of
ratification of the Montreal Protocols and an earlier sup-
plemental compensation plan, but lacked a sufficient ma-
jority to approve them.44 Rejection of the proposed plans
was based on the belief that they do not adequately com-
pensate plaintiffs. 45 The latest Draft Supplemental Com-
pensation Plan (Supplemental Plan) provides additional
compensation coverage for American citizens on interna-
tional flights.4
In the words of former Secretary of Transportation
James Burnley, the Supplemental Plan basically creates "a
private insurance program with unlimited recovery per
passenger for economic damages, subject only to a per in-
cident, per aircraft limitation of $500 million."' 47 The
plan also establishes a claims procedure, and attempts to
encourage the reasonable settlement of claims by the air-
lines. It permits a court to award costs and attorneys' fees
if the airline does not offer to settle the claim both within
specified periods of time and for sums equivalent to two-
thirds of the ultimate recovery awarded under the plan.
The cost of the plan is deferred by a surcharge collected
43 Baumeister, supra note 35, at 6 n.34; see also Aidred, supra note 42, at I;Jacobs
& Kiker, Accident Compensation for Airline Passengers: An Economic Analysis of Liability
Rules Under the Warsaw Convention, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 589 (1986).
44 Parish, Despite Foreign Relations Committee's Endorsement, Senate OK of Montreal
Protocols Remains Uncertain, 4 AIR SAFETY WEEK I (Sept. 10, 1990). The Senate
rejected the proposals with a 50 to 42 vote, short of the required two-thirds ma-
jority. The protocols remain before the Senate for future consideration. Id.
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by the airline carrier and remitted to a private insurance
carrier. The fee has been estimated at about $5.00 per
round-trip international airline ticket purchased in the
United States.48
At first blush, the proposals look impressive. The Pan
Am Flight 103 disaster, however, illustrates a number of
problems which may well prolong the ongoing debate as
to whether any liability limitation should apply. The end
result could be that the provisions for Special Drawing
Rights will be ratified, while the Supplemental Plan will be
terminally stalled by debate. A critical examination of the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention in light of modern
day realities also gives credence to those advocating the
more drastic alternative of abolishing the entire scheme.
1. Criticisms of the Montreal Protocols and Supplemental Plan
A primary criticism of the Montreal Protocol and Sup-
plemental Plan is that the Supplemental Plan only in-
cludes recovery of "economic damages" - for example,
medical bills, rehabilitation expenses, loss of earnings,
loss of homemaker services, and burial expenses. 49 These
damages are only significant in the case of an air crash
victim who survives and who was employed. In the case of
Pan Am Flight 103, the families of the thirty-five Syracuse
University students killed in the disaster would receive
practically no compensation for "economic damages" as
now defined.5 °
A second flaw in the Supplemental Plan is that its limi-
tation on recoverable damages allowing only economic
damages could conflict with state tort laws that do not
contain such a restriction. The laws of most states now
make it possible for a plaintiff to recover for emotional
damage, regardless of physical injury, whereas some courts
continue to erroneously hold that under the Warsaw Con-
48 Id.; see also Annotation, supra note 40, at 495.
49 Aldred, supra note 42, at 38.
so Id.
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vention, a plaintiff may only recover for bodily injury.5'
To solve these problems, the Supplemental Plan is cur-
rently being amended to include whatever damages are
permitted under the law of the state of the plaintiff's
domicile. 2
A third concern is the difficulty of accurately setting an
adequate passenger fee to support the Supplemental
Plan. Agreement on the basis for the fee and appropriate
risk factors to be used will be difficult to reach.53
Although statistics show the number of aviation fatalities
from intentional terrorist activity has increased in the last
decade,54 assessing the risk will still be challenging. It is
impossible to predict the number of terrorist bombings
that will occur each year, and significant numbers of lives
can be lost with each single incident. Arguably, requiring
the airline carriers to pay the additional costs may create
more incentive for the airlines to provide adequate secur-
ity. 55 It is, however, equally likely that any fee paid by the
airlines will simply be passed on to the public in the form
of increased airfares.
A fourth problem with the proposed law is that a differ-
ence still exists between domestic liability for "ground"
claims and international liability for "airborne" claims,
even where both result from the same incident. For ex-
ample, under British law, Pan Am may have unlimited lia-
bility for the personal injury and property damage claims
of the residents of Lockerbie, but its liability to the aircraft
51 Baumeister, supra note 35, at 12-14; see also King v. Eastern Airlines, 536
So.2d 1023, 1027, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d
1462 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990); Gilbert v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc. 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,177 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
-52 Baumeister, supra note 35, at 21.
"3 Aldred, supra note 42, at 28; Mulcahy & Jennings, U.S., Europe Share Pan Am
Crash Cover, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER PROPERTY AND CASUALTY, Dec. 26, 1988, at 1.
54 Murders and Mistakes, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1989, at 54. Over the past ten
years, the number of deaths in planes caused intentionally by other people (shot
down, sabotaged, hijacked) has risen, but the statistics are based both on known
and suspected cases. Id. Sabotage and military action accounted for 11% of the
fatalities on United States carriers in 1988. Ramirez, How Safe Are You in the Air?,
FORTUNE, May 22, 1989, at 80.
5-N Ramirez, supra note 54, at 80.
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passengers would be limited to 100,000 Special Drawing
Rights and "economic damages" under the proposed
amendments.56 Thus, even under the new proposals, the
uniformity of law that is the basis of the Warsaw Conven-
tion remains elusive.
2. The Specter of Punitive Damages
The Pan Am disaster also spotlights the most conten-
tious issue relating to the Warsaw Convention: punitive
damages. The Warsaw Convention is silent as to whether
punitive damages are available to a plaintiff in the absence
of its protection. Article 25 simply states that the airline
carrier cannot limit its liability if it, or its agents, have en-
gaged in willful misconduct. 57 This provision leaves un-
clear the question of a carrier will be open to punitive
damages in circumstances where it has no limited liability.
In Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd. ,58 the Supreme Court in-
terpreted Article 25 literally and held that once a plaintiff
proved the existence of willful misconduct, punitive dam-
ages may be awarded. In contradictin to Chan, however,
the Eleventh Circuit, in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,59 and
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
Harpalani v. Air India, Inc. ,60 both reasoned that the War-
saw Convention deals solely with the recovery of compen-
satory damages and, therefore, Article 25 was merely a
waiver of the usual limitations on the recovery of com-
pensatory damages alone.
More recently, the issue of punitive damages was di-
rectly addressed in In re Hiacking of Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi International Airport on September
5, 1986.61 In the January 18, 1990 order ofJudge Sprizzo,
-5,1 Shapiro & McLeod, Pan Am Liability Claims to Exceed $250 Million, Bus. INS.,
Dec. 26, 1988, at 38.
-11 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3 art. 25.
5m 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
- 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990).
634 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
729 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), reprinted in Baumeister, supra note 35, at
Appendix; see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland on Dec. 12,
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the District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that the words of Article 25 provide for the lifting
of all limitations on recovery, whether compensatory or
otherwise. Thus, any damages available at common law,
including punitive damages, are available to the plaintiff
once he meets the predicates of Article 25.62 The oppo-
site conclusion was reached by the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York on January 3, 1990. In the
case arising directly from Pan Am Flight 103, In re Air Dis-
aster in Lockerbie, Scotland, 3 Chief Judge Platt followed the
Floyd decision of the Eleventh Circuit, and held that the
Warsaw Convention bars punitive damage claims. Coun-
sel for the plaintiffs have now petitioned the decision of
ChiefJudge Platt to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
asking for affirmation of the Karachi decision. 4 If the Sec-
ond Circuit affirms the Karachi decision, a dispute will ex-
ist between that circuit and the Eleventh Circuit which will
ultimately be taken to the United States Supreme Court.
Those who argue that punitive damages are not pre-
cluded by Article 25 point to the effectiveness of these
damages in deterring and punishing corporate miscon-
duct.65 They view the "insurance standard" established
by the Warsaw Convention as outmoded and prefer to re-
vert to a true tort system where fault determines compen-
sation. Opponents argue that the limitation of liability
provided by the Warsaw Convention would effectively be
eliminated if punitive damages were available, and this ac-
tion would raise possible insurability problems for the air-
1985, 684 F. Supp. 927, 932 (W.D. Ky. 1987). The court held that Articles 3 and
25 are most reasonably interpreted as exceptions to the limitations on compensa-
tory damages, not as authority for the recovery of punitive damages. Id.
62 Karachi, 729 F. Supp. at 19-20.
-' No. MDL 799 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1990) (1990 WESTLAW 29764), reprinted in
Baumeister, supra note 35, at Appendix.
64 Baumeister, supra note 35 (in presentation only). The case was set for hear-
ing on Oct. 1, 1990. Telephone interview with office of attorney Michael
Baumeister, Member of Plaintiffs' Committee for In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scot-
land, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Sept. 20, 1990).
6- Baumeister, supra note 35, at 15; D. JOHNSTON, supa note 4, at 184-85.
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line carriers.66
3. Overdue for an Overhaul
As it stands, the Warsaw Convention serves little pur-
pose in encouraging airline security or safety. It simply
provides a uniform system of compensation once the
damage is alreadyfait accompli. For this reason, some crit-
ics argue for the abolition of the Warsaw Convention alto-
gether, in favor of "fault liability" as established by local
law.67 Arguably, the Warsaw Convention is now an anach-
ronism, given ever-increasing numbers of passengers and
solid air carrier profit margins.
Assuming a viable purpose exists, few would dispute
that the current provisions of the Warsaw Convention are
inadequate, even with the 1966 modifications. Specula-
tion exists that after the December 1985 crash of a DC-8
jetliner in Gander, Newfoundland, also suspected of be-
ing a bombing,68 the international liability limits were
simply ignored.69 Even if Pan Am Flight 103 plaintiffs re-
cover outside the Warsaw Convention, the need to amend
both the current treaty and the proposed protocols and
Supplemental Plan is evident.
On May 15, 1990, the President's Commission on Avia-
tion Security and Terrorism endorsed the ratification of
Montreal Protocol 3 "together with a supplemental com-
pensation plan that would provide all United States citi-
zens and permanent residents, for any international flight,
full recovery of all economic and non-economic damages"
and suggested that "[flollowing ratification, the United
States should commence a diplomatic initiative to in-
- Aldred, supra note 42, at 28; Baumeister, supra note 35, at 15.
W Aldred, supra note 42, at 28; Baumeister, supra note 35, at 18-21.
- Hughes, supra note 8, at 58. The cause of the Gander crash has not been
conclusively determined, but a public action group similar to "Victims of Pan Am
Flight 103," "Families for the Truth About Gander," are convinced a bomb or fire
was the cause. Bell, Americans Want Answers to the Gander Crash, Daily Courier (copy
of article on file at office of Journal of Air Law & Commerce). It has been suggested
that the Gander, Newfoundland crash on December 12, 1985, was linked to the
Iran-Contra affair. See Bell, supra note 22.
69 Shapiro & McLeod, supra note 56, at 38.
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crease the $130,000 limit on carrier liability."7 ° The Sen-
ate bill codifying the recommendations of the Presidential
Committee 7' lacks any provision dealing with Protocol 3,
however. In contrast, the companion House bill72 con-
tains a provision stating that:
"[t]he United States Government should encourage all
other nations to promptly adopt the Montreal Protocol
No. 3 revisions to the Warsaw Convention and Supple-
mentary Compensation Plans thereunder, to provide full
recoveries for passengers killed or injured in terrorist acts
against aircraft on international flights, or in other inter-
national aviation accidents."7
3
In early 1990, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
endorsed Protocol 3.T To encourage Senate approval,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee endorsed yet an-
other supplemental compensation plan that increases the
proposed compensation fund, accessible by American vic-
tims of international aircraft accidents and their survivors,
from $200 million to $500 million per accident per air-
craft. Opponents still resist the package, however, be-
cause it continues to eliminate the ability of claimants to
recover unlimited damages in cases of willful misconduct,
and because they believe airline carriers have sufficient re-
sources to eliminate liability limits altogether.7 5
In any event, parties on both sides agree that resolution
of the issue will not occur prior to the 1990 adjournment
of the Senate, since bills having higher priority will likely
take precedence.76 Perhaps this stalemate is fortuitous.
70 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 124.
7, Aviation Security Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1.
72 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 2(b).
7- Id. § 2(6).
74 The Committee voted for ratification II to 2, but critics in the Senate stated
they would oppose ratification on the basis that liability limits should be elimi-
nated entirely. Parrish, supra note 44, at 1-2.
7. Id. at 2.
7, Id. at 2-3. During the week of September 10, 1990, Senator D'Amato called
on the Senate to vote in favor of the Warsaw Convention amendments before
Congress adjourned. The 101st Congress should be extended past the October
5, 1990 adjournment date due to contentious bills such as those dealing with
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Although reform is necessary, the entire compensation
scheme created by the Warsaw Convention needs a thor-
ough overhaul, and piecemeal patching of the scheme
may not be the best solution in the long run.
B. Legislative Initiatives
Although no conclusive statement has been made re-
garding the method by which the bomb was planted on
board Pan Am Flight 103, the bulk of the initial legislative
action concerned bomb detection by airport security de-
vices. The focus on improving bomb and weapon detec-
tion through advanced technology indicates that the
immediate response of government was simply to find the
bombs before they found us. The facts surrounding Pan
Am Flight 103 raise some interesting questions about the
wisdom of this approach to passenger protection.
An emphasis on bomb detection presupposes that ade-
quate technology exists to find all destructive bombs and
weapons, that the personnel employed to operate the
technological devices are skilled, informed, and responsi-
ble, and that those implementing the security programs
are incorruptible and apolitical. It also assumes that
bombs find their way onto airplanes in baggage, primarily
checked baggage, rather than by access to the plane
outside the airport terminal. Most importantly, it reflects
the belief that the FAA, through regulation of domestic
and foreign' airports, can better protect passengers than
informed passengers can protect themselves.
Despite their obvious shortcomings, the 1989 bills pro-
vide a useful framework for the discussion of aviation se-
curity issues. The funding difficulties they encountered
provide insight into the economic underpinnings of avia-
tion legislation. As historical background, the 1989 bills
provide a useful comparison with 1990 legislation. In
comparison, the later legislation appears to be supported
budget matters and appropriations. See D'Amato Seeks Montreal Protocol OK Before
Adjournment of Congress, AIR SAFETY WEEK, Sept. 17, 1990, at 4.
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by more solid information and considerably more fore-
thought. A synopsis of the now defunct Airport Security
Research and Technology Act of 1989 and Aviation Se-
curity Act of 1989 follows.
1. The Airport Technology and Research Act of 1989
The Airport Technology and Research Act of 1989
(ATRA) was introduced as a House bill on May 16,
1989. 77 It was referred to both the House Public Works
and Transportation Committee and the House Science,
Space and Technology Committee on that day, and was
then sent to a House subcommittee. On May 31, 1989,
the House Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation
and Materials approved the bill for full committee action.
A fourth amended version was reported in the House on
September 19, 1989,78 and on September 25, it was voted
on and passed unanimously by the House of Representa-
tives. 79 The House requested the concurrence of the Sen-
ate on September 26, 1989.80 On the same day, the
Senate referred the bill to the Senate Commerce, Science
and Transportation Committee.8 ' The Senate then held
the bill in abeyance, pending receipt of the report of the
President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terror-
ism and the outcome of the Aviation Security Act of
1989.82 The introduction onJune 28, 1990 of companion
Senate and House bills for the proposed Aviation Security
Improvement Act of 199083 sounded the death knell for
ATRA.
77 135 CONG. REC. H1976 (daily ed. May 16, 1989); see supra note 1.
78 135 CONG. REC. H5753 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1989).
7) 135 CONG. REC. H5881 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989).
135 CONG. REC. S11759 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989).
135 CONG. REC. S11879 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1989).
92 Telephone interview withJ. Feathers, Senate Document Room, Washington
D.C. (Feb. 27, 1990); Telephone information requests from Senate Commerce
Committee and Legislative Information, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 27, 1990); Tele-
phone interview with C. Carmody, Senate Commerce Committee, Washington,
D.C. (Feb. 27, 1990) (on status of H.R. 1659 and H.R. 2365).
"I House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1; Aviation Security
Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1.
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The stated purposes of ATRA were the following: "(1)
To support cost-effectiveness and operational feasibility
evaluations of alternative explosives detection systems for
possible implementation at airports. (2) To promote ac-
celerated research and development of future explosives
detection technologies for use in airports." 4 ATRA was
the direct legislative response to the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 and drew additional support from the bombing
of the French UTA Flight 772 over Niger by extremist
Shiite Moslems in mid-September of 1989.85 The legisla-
tion reflected the realization that the technology of ter-
rorists had surpassed the ability of existing conventional
airport devices to detect weapons and explosives. For ex-
ample, metal detectors and x-ray machines would be en-
tirely ineffective in detecting the Semtex plastic explosive
used in the Pan Am Flight 103 bomb. Whereas the Air-
port Security Act of 1990 was primarily directed toward
developing a specific security device, ATRA was con-
cerned with providing funds for evaluating the effective-
ness and operational feasibility of a variety of new aviation
detection systems.
Since 1970, taxes on fuel and cargo, and an eight per-
cent surcharge on every airline passenger's ticket have
contributed to an Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust
Fund) which supports aviation and airport projects and
programs. Program expenditures are dependent on an-
nual appropriations.8 6 The funds are distributed in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Airport and Airway
Improvement Act of 1982.87 Thus, the original purpose
of the Trust Fund was to finance capital improvement pro-
grams. By amending section 506 of the Airport and Air-
way Improvement Act of 1982, ATRA proposed to
84 Airport Technology and Research Act, supra note 1, § 2(b).
ss 135 CONG. REC. H5761 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statements of Rep.
Clinger); 135 CONG. REC. H3147 (1989) (statements of Rep. Borski); Salholz, Ter-
ror at 30,000 Feet: Who Did the Bombing, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 1989, at 30.
- Nutting, Bush's Airport User Fee Plan Wins Public Approval, CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP., June 30, 1990, at 2052.
87 49 U.S.C. app. § 2205(a) (1988).
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increase the FAA's budget for research, engineering, and
development for the 1990 fiscal year by $8 million. Of the
total budget, ATRA earmarked $16 million exclusively for
"research on, and evaluation of aviation and airport se-
curity projects and activities."' 88 In effect, ATRA allocated
more Trust Funds to more security projects, not all of
them capital improvement projects. This proposal
proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to Senate ap-
proval of the bill, just as in the case of the Aviation Secur-
ity Act. 89
2. The Aviation Security Act of 1989
The Aviation Security Act of 1989 was introduced as a
House bill on April 3, 1989.90 The House then forwarded
the bill to the House Committee on Public Works and
Transportation, 9' which approved an amended version on
May 18, 1989.92 The bill then went to the House Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs and, after further amendment, was
approved on September 7, 1989. 93 The House passed a
fourth version of the Bill by a 392-31 vote on September
20, 1989.14 The House requested Senate concurrence on
September 25, 1989." On the same day, the bill went to
the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Com-
mittee where it was shelved with ATRA, likewise awaiting
a report of the seven-member President's Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism.96
a. TNA: The Technology Solution
A primary purpose of the Aviation Security Act was to
135 CONG. REC. H5882 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989).
For a discussion of funding issues, see infra note 169-218 and accompanying
text.
135 CONG. REc. H1331 (daily ed. April 3, 1989); see supra note 1.
135 CONG. REC. H2046 (daily ed. May 19, 1989).
"1 H.R. REP. No. 59, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
im 135 CONG. REC. H5411 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
11 135 CONG. REc. H5767 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989).
135 CONG. REC. S 11759 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989).
Id.
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facilitate the use of "thermal neutron analysis" (TNA) de-
vices in strategic airports. The Aviation Security Act
would have amended the Federal Aviation Act of 195897
to require all air carriers to maintain and use explosive
detection equipment applying technology equal to, or
better than, thermal neutron analysis technology.
Section 101 of the Aviation Security Act provided that
TNA devices were to be paid for from Trust Fund re-
sources. The bill allocated $100 million from the Trust
Fund for this purpose. As each TNA device costs between
$750,000 and $1 million dollars, 98 the Aviation Security
Act's rate of funding equated to only 100 devices world-
wide. Although legislators contemplated the installation
of TNA devices in about forty-five major airports world
wide, to date only two machines have been purchased and
installed (to the frustration of "Victims of Pan Am Flight
103"),99 and only five more installations were scheduled
for 1990.100
TNA devices use low-level radiation to identify explo-
sives. The device bombards the luggage with neutrons,
and then analyzes the luggage for traces of organic chemi-
cals used in plastic explosives. 0 ' Initially, FAA testing at
Los Angeles and San Francisco showed the devices to be
95 percent successful in finding bombs, with a false alarm
rate of only 4 percent.0 2 The President's Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism has since reported the
technology cannot reliably detect the small amounts of
plastic explosives that have characterized plastic bombs
S,7 49 U.S.C. app. § 1356 (1988).
t, 135 CONG. REC. H5883 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989) (statements of Rep. Lewis);
Power, One More Reason for Fear of Flying, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 16, 1989, at 31; Riley,
The Hard Road to Airport Security, FORTUNE, May 22, 1989, at 84.
is MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour - Focus: Early Warning System: Passenger Threats on Air-
lines (WNET television broadcast, Jan. 19, 1990) (transcript on file at office of
Journal of Air Law & Commerce).
oo Riley, supra note 98, at 84.
"" PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 63; see also Section Notes: Aviation
Security R & D Wins House Approval, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Sept. 30, 1990, at
2556; Pytte, Committees Resolve Turf War Over Airport Trust Fund, CONG. Q WEEKLY
REP., July 14, 1990, at 2216.
102 Riley, supra note 98, at 84; D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 196.
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since at least 1982.103
Another limitation of TNA technology is that each de-
vice weighs approximately ten tons. Thus, each airport
that acquires this machine will have to structurally rein-
force the building in which it is installed.1 0 4 Additionally,
TNA devices are slow. It takes approximately six seconds
to screen each bag, and airport operators estimate it will
take one hour to screen 600 bags.1 1 5 Although TNA has
been touted as the most advanced technology available, in
its present form it is unable to detect minute amounts of
explosives, and cannot detect liquid-based or non-nitro-
gen based explosives. Also, because TNA devices use nu-
clear radiation, they are unsuitable for screening
passengers and carry-on luggage. 0 °
Modern aircraft bombs are compact, come disguised in
a variety of forms, and are affordable by the terrorist
groups that employ them. For example, a bomb such as
that thought to have been used on Pan Am Flight 103 re-
quires only about 300 grams of Semtex plastic explosive.
A thin layer of the explosive is sandwiched within a metal-
lic-coated paper to resemble the transformer of a radio-
cassette player.10 7 Two fuses are linked to the explosive's
detonator. A barometric fuse containing mercury is
designed to trigger the explosive when the airplane
reaches a certain altitude; the mercury expands as the at-
mospheric pressure drops during the airplane's ascent.
This type of bomb can be detected by a decompression
chamber which artificially creates the conditions present
in the non-pressurized cargo hold of a climbing aircraft.
Most major airports have these decompression chain-
Io" PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 64.
104 135 CONG. REC. H5883 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989) (statements of Rep. Mc-
Curdy); D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 210.
-5 135 CONG. REC. H5770 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989) (statements of Rep. Glick-
man); Riley, supra note 98, at 84. For a different time estimate, see Dorsey, Bush to
Form Panel to Probe Flight 103 Bombing, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Aug. 21, 1989, at 55.
- 135 CONG. REC. H5883 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (statements by Rep. Mc-
Curdy); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 63.
107 D.JOINSTON, supra note 4, at 148. In the case of Pan Am Flight 103, it was a
"Toblar" brand candy wrapper. Id.
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bers. 08 Therefore, a second fuse is used to delay the acti-
vation of the mercury fuse; it is an electronic timing
device set to allow the baggage enough time to go
through the airport's decompression chamber and be
placed on the aircraft before the mercury fuse detonates
the bomb.109
Raffle Eitan, Israel's former chief of military staff and a
terrorism expert, holds the opinion that the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palistine-General Command might
have obtained the bomb (or the necessary technology)
from the Arab Organization of 15 May.110 This group,
which ironically acquired much of its bombmaking exper-
tise from the Iraqis, is believed to reside safely in Syria.'II
Given the sophistication of the devices, the possible Arab
Organization manufacturers, and the potential of protec-
tion and support of Syria, it seems virtually certain that
the funding and technological advancement of terrorists
could surpass that of the FAA. This possibility must be
considered in any analysis of the effectiveness of the 1989
legislative initiatives in the United States.
b. Screening and Airport Security Programs
One of the main complaints of "Victims of Pan Am
Flight 103" and allegations in the lawsuits against Pan
Am, is that ALERT, the security personnel contracted by
Pan Am and stationed at Frankfurt, were inadequately
trained and negligent in performing their duties. For ex-
ample, the persons questioning passengers at the Frank-
furt airport were not fluent in English and had learned to
ask questions phonetically. 1 2 Although private lawsuits
will ultimately decide the issue of the competence of Pan
Am and its contractors, it is incumbent on the FAA to en-
sure that, in the future, some correlation exists between
108 Id.
-o Id. at 149; see also Duffy, supra note 10, at 44.
11o D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 149.
, Id., at 150.
"' MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour - Focus, supra note 99 (statement by Bert Ammer-
man, transcript at 11).
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its regulated standards of conduct and the legal standard
of care imposed on air carriers and airport operators, as
well as their respective agents and contractors. If the FAA
standard continues to fall behind the legal standard, com-
pliance with FAA regulations will be meaningless. At the
same time, airline carriers will cite their compliance with
the regulated standard as proof of their lack of negli-
gence. In this way, improvident or inadequate regulation
will actually inhibit the development of better security,
both by dampening the threat of successful litigation
against air carriers and airport operators, and by failing to
provide guidelines which will encourage the implementa-
tion of appropriate and uniform security measures.
Unfortunately, establishing guidelines for aviation se-
curity programs will not be simple. To be effective, a pro-
gram must provide guidelines appropriate to all airports,
whether domestic or foreign, and whether owned by the
state, by a government controlled corporation, or by pri-
vate interests. It must take into account the inability of a
United States air carrier to control the operations of a for-
eign airport, and the undesirability of the United States
financing foreign security operations while financing its
own. A key problem is the reluctance of United States
carriers to substantially increase their expenditures for se-
curity. Estimates now place these security costs at about
$1 billion per year." 3 Finally, in addition to being eco-
nomically feasible, the security program must be
workable.
In an effort to come up with a workable security pro-
gram, section 216 of the Aviation Security Act required
that a feasibility report be obtained regarding implemen-
tation by United States carriers of the security measures
adopted by El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. (El Al). El Al has a
reputation for having the world's tightest security. It
matches its passengers with their luggage before each
flight and puts passengers through complete and detailed
1 Power, supra note 98, at 31.
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questioning."14 El Al passengers are required to check in
significantly earlier for their flights than passengers on
other carriers, however, and the airline's security costs are
estimated at $30 million annually."1 5 Other carriers are
quick to note that El Al has only twenty-one aircraft and
annual sales of an estimated $600 million, part of which is
government subsidized." t6
The Aviation Security Act also required a study of the
feasibility and implications of expanding the type of in-
spection of travel documents performed by the United
States at the last point of departure into the United
States." 7 In addition, the Act proposed establishing a
task force on general aviation security with members to
be drawn from various sectors of industry and
government. "18
To improve security at airports in the immediate future,
section 102 of the Aviation Security Act would have
amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to require
screening of passengers and carry-on luggage of all
scheduled aircraft carrying more than thirty passengers.
Section 102 also provided for amendment of the Airport
and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 to appropriate $170
million from the Trust Fund to assist sponsors of airports
to acquire and install computer-controlled access doors.
These doors would ensure that only authorized persons
would have access to secured areas of airports. Rules
promulgated by the FAA now require the installation of
such doors." 9 One reporter noted that with 270 major
airports in the United States, the amount of the funds al-




117 Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 217.
- Id. § 218.
1" PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 175. These emergency rules
were announced by the FAA on December 31, 1988, as "extraordinary" measures
to tighten aviation security programs at airports in Western Europe and the Mid-
dle East. Id.; see also Airports, Airlines Tighten Security, supra note 10, at 2-3.
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of 128 access points to be secured at each airport. 20 He
then noted that "[o]fficials at Chicago's O'Hare stopped
counting at 1,627 and never even made it to the cargo
area. No wonder industry experts say the price will be
more like $1.7 billion."'' 2'
Section 104 of the Aviation Security Act provided for
FAA approval of security programs of airport operators,
including approval of programs incorporating existing se-
curity programs of airport tenants that did not have FAA
approval. This provision was an attempt to coordinate
the efforts of airport operators and their air carrier ten-
ants. It provided for the monitoring and enforcement of
the security program by the airport operator. It also ex-
culpated from statutory liability any airport operator that
demonstrated it followed the measures set out in its se-
curity program to obtain the tenant's compliance and that
the tenant, or its employee, permittee, or invitee was re-
sponsible for the violation of the security program. 22
Given the ongoing debate these exculpatory provisions
have engendered in similarly worded legislation, such as
the Warsaw Convention, it is incomprehensible why the
drafters continued to include such provisions in the Avia-
tion Security Act. 123 Arguably, because market forces will
provide greater sanctions against airline carriers (whose
reputation for safety is of commercial value), and because
airport operators are already virtual monopolies, this part
of section 104 warranted rethinking.
With respect to foreign air carriers, section 105 re-
quired quarterly publication of the names of foreign air
carriers that were complying with FAA security measures
at airports served by American air carriers where ap-
proved security programs were operating. 2 4 Likewise,
section 209 required that the FAA Administrator notify
120 Riley, supra note 98, at 84.
121 Id.
122 Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 104.
". See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3.
124 Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 105.
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the Secretary of State of any continuing noncompliance
with a security plan required of a foreign carrier. In case
of noncompliance, the Secretary of State was to issue a
travel advisory with respect to that carrier or any routes
affected by that carrier's noncompliance. Section 209
only required that the travel advisory be published in the
Federal Register, however. 2 -5 Quaere how many passen-
gers subscribe to, and read, the Federal Register.
The drafters also believed it useful to inform the public
of the names of those nations that are not signatories to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 26 and the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.'2 7
This information was to be published at least annually in
the Federal Register for those prudent passengers sub-
scribing to it. Ironically, although section 205 called on
nonsignatory nations to "expeditiously become a party to
such international agreements," as of November 1989 the
United States itself had not ratified the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation. An executive report of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee dated November 19, 1989 recommends
that the Senate consent to its ratification. 2 8
To eliminate inconsistencies in and upgrade the quality
of training and service provided by security contractors in
airports around the world, section 206 allocated $2 mil-
lion for airport security training and assistance under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.29 In addition, section
106 set forth a "rulemaking proceeding" to "propose and
consider methods of improving the effectiveness of secur-
ity screening of air carrier passengers and carry-on bag-
"5 id. § 209.
-,; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 13, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
'1' Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 10 I.L.M. 1151.
129 S. EXEC. REP. No. 17, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989).
129 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988); see also Warning Appended to Security Bill, CONG Q
WEEKLY REP., May 27, 1989, at 1251.
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gage, including ... Federal certification of air carrier
security screening personnel and . . . [improvement of
the] qualifications, training, management and retention of
such personnel."' 30
c. Dogs, Chemical Markers, and Other Measures
Section 107 of the Aviation Security Act provided that
funding was to be appropriated for an Explosive Detec-
tion K-9 Team Training Program for the fifty largest air-
ports in the United States. This program was to involve
the training and use of "bomb-sniffing" dogs to detect
plastic explosives at airports and aboard aircraft.' 3 ' The
security company hired by Pan Am for its Frankfurt opera-
tions had bomb-sniffing dogs, but the "Victims of Pan Am
Flight 103," allege that the dogs were merely rented from
a kennel and were not properly trained. 32
Preblast chemical taggants or markers are another way
of ensuring detection of chemical explosives, including
plastic, malleable and gel-based explosives.' 3 This alter-
native is more cost-effective than TNA, and it is supported
by both the Airport Operators Council International and
-the American Association of Airport Executives. 34 Sec-
tion 203 of the Aviation Security Act required the Secre-
tary of State to take "appropriate steps (including
negotiations for bilateral and multilateral agreements)" to
ensure that manufacturers of plastic explosives incorpo-
rated taggants or markers in the explosives to facilitate
their detection. Underlying this provision was the hope
that manufacturing countries could be made to take re-
sponsibility for the use of their products by encouraging
them, through the unexpressed threat of retaliation, to
consider to whom the explosives would be sold. The abil-
,.'o Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 106.
1- 135 CONG. REC. H5762 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (amendment proposed by
Rep. Burton).
1." MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour - Focus, supra note 99 (transcript at 11).
,.- 135 CONG. REC. H5773 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statements of Rep.
Burton).
1-14 Dorsey, supra note 105, at 55.
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ity to effect such a security measure, however, is depen-
dent upon the cooperation of the countries that
manufacture explosives. The statute failed to address this
practical problem.
The wording of the Aviation Security Act suggested
that the development of new chemical explosives might
antedate the discovery of appropriate chemical markers.
Subsection 203(4) called on countries producing the ex-
plosives to require that a taggant or marker "be incorpo-
rated in any high explosive manufactured in that country
as soon as a taggant or marker suitable for that form of
explosive is developed."'' 3 5 This measure seems akin to
closing the stable door after the horse is already gone.
Not specifically included under the Aviation Security
Act as an option, but contemplated in its provisions for
research, were "vapor sniffers." These devices are sensi-
tive to nitrogen and oxygen, which are ingredients in
most explosives. t3 6 Unlike TNA devices, vapor sniffers
are portable and can be used at airport gates, on-board,
and even at the aircraft's air-conditioning exhaust vent.137
Section 213 came the closest of any provision to al-
lowing the involvement of airline passengers in their own
safety. In a "frontier justice" approach to aviation secur-
ity, Subsection 213(c) provided for the publication of
United States Government rewards for information on in-
ternational terrorist-related activities. The amount of
these rewards was to be increased from $500,000 to a
maximum of $2 million. An amendment proposal sug-
gested that the government be authorized to give rewards
for information leading to the apprehension and convic-
tion of terrorists responsible for attacks against the per-
sonnel and passengers of United States flag airlines, as
well as United States embassies, facilities and citizens.
The final House version of the Act omitted wording be-
" Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 203(4).
,' Riley, supra note 98, at 84.
137 Id.
1990] 443
444 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
yond "attacks on U.S. citizens and property.' ' 3 8
On a more useful note, subsection 213(a) called for the
development and publication of guidelines to "thwart ef-
forts by international terrorists to enlist the unwitting
assistance of international aviation travelers in terrorist
activities.' m3 9 Using an unsuspecting passenger to carry a
package onto a flight is a classic method of getting bombs
onto airplanes.' 41 Subsection 213(b) required the Secre-
tary of State and Secretary of Transportation to negotiate
with other nations for international standards regarding
these guidelines. 141
d. Preventative Post-Disaster Provisions
Disorganization and insensitivity of both government
and Pan Am officials exacerbated the trauma experienced
by the friends and family of those killed on Pan Am Flight
103.142 The litany of complaints of misinformation, mis-
management, and mistreatment stemmed in part from the
magnitude of the disaster. 4 3 A lack of preparation and
resources and the apparent inability of the government to
accept responsibility for the needs of the bereaved ac-
counted for most of the problems. For example, the State
Department relied on Pan Am to contact the families of
- 135 CONG. REc. H5765 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1990) (statements of Rep.
Walsh).
1.9 Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 213(b).
140 D.JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 147-48. Originally, investigators believed that
a female passenger on Pan Am Flight 103 was duped into carrying the bomb in
her luggage under the pretense that it was a Christmas present to be mailed to the
donor's friend in the United States. Id. More recently it has been speculated that
a DEA-related drug courier brought the bomb onto the flight in his luggage, mis-
taking it for drugs, and that the suitcase carrying the bomb may have been assisted
past security checkpoints with the help of West German police. Calgary Newshour,
supra note 13.
14 Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 213(b).
142 D.JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 35-42; Fisher, State Department Says Retaliation is
Already an Option: Accepts Criticism Over Treatment of Victim's Families, AIR SAFErv
WEEK, May 21, 1990, at 3; Ludtke, supra note 22, at 33; Telephone interview with
Georgia Nucci, supra note 14. For a general view of the treatment of the bereaved
families, see Donohue, supra note 30.
143 Approximately two thousand people flooded into Lockerbie within a day of
the crash. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 50.
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the deceased. This decision has since been termed "seri-
ously flawed." 14 4 In some instances, the callous treatment
of the bereaved by both government and Pan Am was in-
excusable. For example, several relatives were told to
pick up their "shipment" from the livestock quarantine
area of an airport warehouse. On their arrival at the ware-
house, a forklift was used to transport the cardboard box
containing the remains of their loved one. t45
Section 212 of the Aviation Security Act sought to elim-
inate a repeat performance of this incompetence by ex-
panding the State Department's crisis management
training program for all diplomatic and consular officers
abroad. Improvements included a toll-free telephone ser-
vice solely for the use of family members of American vic-
tims of foreign disasters. The statute also required the
Secretary of State to establish a program to handle tele-
phone inquiries by next-of-kin in the event of a major dis-
aster abroad. 46
Section 215 called for the imposition of multilateral
sanctions against any country supporting or harboring
terrorists. Suggested sanctions included prohibiting air-
craft of such countries from engaging in air transportation
with the boycotting nations, denying overflight permis-
sion, and banning the export and sale of aviation equip-
ment to such countries.147
e. Security Bulletins
United States airlines and airports adjust the level of se-
curity based on information they receive from FAA and
local government security bulletins. The source of these
bulletins is confidential in order to protect those who pro-
vide the information.148 Warnings of potential threats to
,44 135 CONG. REC. H5772 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statements of Rep.
Snowe).
145 Donohue, supra note 30 (statements of Ms. O'Connor).
14,1 Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 212.
147 Id. § 215.
1'4 D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 167.
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security are assessed by persons from the FAA, CIA, FBI,
and the Defense Intelligence Agency, among others. The
FAA revised its security bulletin process in April of
1989.149 Previously, if a legitimate threat was determined
to exist, an FAA Security Bulletin was issued and a Fed-
eral Air Marshal or Aviation Security Specialist was sent to
coordinate protection with the specific air carrier and the
security officials of the airport involved. A long term
threat or ongoing danger resulted in a travel advisory.
Security bulletins communicated other threats to the em-
bassies, missions, American carrier(s) or the domestic air-
ports affected. The air carrier(s) and airport authorities
then presumably acted in accordance with their security
program. At the same time, the American embassy secur-
ity office communicated the threat to the government of
the local airport involved, and hopefully that government
took some action.
On paper, the Security Bulletin process of the FAA did
not appear to be deficient. It is not the process or the law
that creates security, however; it is the effort and account-
ability of the people working within the process that mat-
ters. A security bulletin process is only effective if the
threats underlying the bulletins are taken seriously, if the
bulletins themselves are accurate, if they are given to peo-
ple who can use them, and if those people act on that
information.
In the case of Pan Am Flight 103, warnings of a bomb
were received, and FAA security bulletins were issued.
14 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 176-78. On April 3, 1989, the
Transportation Secretary announced several new security initiatives, including
some tightening of the security bulletin process:
Information Circulars are now used to notify U.S. airlines of general
situations and security information for which the FAA will not re-
quire mandatory countermeasures. Security Directives are used to
pass on specific, credible treats and mandatory countermeasures, re-
quiring acknowledgement of receipt and a report of implementation.
It is a regulatory violation, subject to a civil penalty to fail to comply
with a security directive or to release information from security di-
rectives without authorization.
Id. The process still did not require public notification of threats.
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They were ineffective in preventing the bombing, how-
ever, because they were discounted or simply ignored. 50
The handling of the events leading up to the Pan Am
Flight 103 bombing was indicative of a fundamental prob-
lem more serious than an ineffective security bulletin pro-
cess or the failure of Pan Am or the government to strictly
adhere to such a process. The lack of communication and
coordinated effort between the FAA, the State Depart-
ment and American intelligence gathering agencies were
also responsible. The following is a brief account of how
the system failed.'15
A lengthy surveillance operation by West German intel-
ligence culminated on October 26, 1988 in the arrest of at
least seventeen people, some of whom were members of
the PFLP-GC. Residences in Frankfurt were raided as
part of the operation. Within twenty-four hours, Interpol
in Paris was warned of the findings: guns, ammunition,
and a bomb thought to be similar to that used on Pan Am
Flight 103. The West German police called for a meeting
on November 15, 1988. Meeting participants, which in-
cluded British intelligence experts, were given photo-
graphs of the cassette-recorder bomb. By November 22, a
telex containing a photograph of the radio-cassette bomb
had been sent to the security staff at all United Kingdom
airports and airlines with a warning that others might
exist.
The FAA bulletins contained no mention of the Octo-
,.10 D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 105-06, 111-15, 161-82; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
REPORT supra note 6, at 6-11, 22, 83, 84; see also Airport Security: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials of the House Committee on Science,
Space and Technology, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Foreign Airport Security Hearing
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. (1989); Department
of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1990: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Aviation
Security: Special Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Aviation Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Aviation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989).
1.51 The information related in the account of how the system failed in the Lock-
erbie tragedy was gleaned by the author from various sources, supra note 150.
Some specific citations have been noted.
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ber raids until November 2, 1988. Bulletin 88-17 men-
tioned the raids, and Bulletin 88-18, issued November 3,
mentioned the arrests. 52 Bulletin 88-17 suggested that
airline security personnel "disseminate the information to
corporate officials able to take precautionary measures in
the event that specific threat information is developed
that must be passed and reacted to extremely quickly."' 153
Thus, some passengers received notification of the poten-
tial bomb threat while others did not. Bulletin 88-18 con-
centrated on hijacking and did not mention bombing at
all. On November 17, 1988, Bulletin 88-19 advised that a
bomb was found, described its construction, and noted
that it would be "difficult to detect with normal x-ray in-
spection" and, therefore, it might be intended to pass
through airport security controls. The bulletin then gave
a summary of the PFLP-GC raid but incorrectly described
the terrorist activities of the PFLP-GC. 154
On December 5, 1988, the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki re-
ceived an anonymous call about a plot to blow up a Pan
Am flight traveling from Frankfurt to the United States in
two weeks. The chief of the security police in Finland re-
portedly said that three similar calls were previously made
to the Israeli embassy in Helsinki. These calls were as-
sessed and found to be a hoax. Thus, the December 5
"Helsinki warning" was also discounted. The British
Transport Secretary, however, told Members of Parlia-
ment that the FAA issued a security bulletin received by
the British Department of Transport on December 9,
1988. December 5 was also the day Bulletin 88-20 was
issued. That bulletin noted that the use of improvised ex-
plosive devices continued to be a preferred terrorist tech-
nique. Airlines were simply advised to rigorously adhere
to their existing security measures.15 5
On December 7, the FAA told airlines that persons dis-
'1' D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 170-71.
15, Id. at 171 (quoting Bulletin 88-17).
1-54 Id. at 69 (quoting Bulletin 88-19).
15 Id. at 171 (discussing Bulletin 88-20).
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guised as law enforcement agents had questioned Trans-
World Airlines (TWA) in Frankfurt about transporting
explosives, a detonator, and pistols. Two weeks later, Pan
Am Flight 103 was bombed.
The Aviation Security Act attempted to address some of
the obvious flaws in the bulletin process. To ensure fu-
ture bomb threats would not go unheeded, section 210
required the FAA to establish a follow-up system to deter-
mine what action was taken with respect to security bulle-
tins disseminated abroad to American airlines.156 To
avoid a double standard as to who could obtain the bene-
fit of the warnings, and to protect the confidentiality of
informants, section 211 provided that FAA security bulle-
tins could only be distributed to certain officers at diplo-
matic and consular posts. They were not to be released
publicly, passed to travel agents or United States busi-
nesses, posted in public places, or distributed within the
post. They were also not to be used to respond to public
or media inquiries. 57 Finally, to remedy a shortage of
FAA security personnel, section 207 required the FAA to
report on its efforts to increase its staffing levels and to
use civil aviation security specialists to help the airline
security coordinators act on any legitimate threats
received. I58
f. Bomb Threats and Passenger Warnings
One of the most controversial issues remaining in the
wake of Pan Am Flight 103 is whether bomb warnings re-
ceived by an airline or the government should be shared
with the passengers who are about to purchase tickets for,
or embark on, a flight. To airline passengers, their
friends, and families, this is likely the most important is-
sue of all: the passenger's right to information relating to
security in the air, and the right to be free of forced reli-
ance on the "protection" of government and the airlines.
116 Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 210.
1- Id. § 211.
' Id. § 207.
1990] 449
450 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
Section 211 of the proposed Aviation Security Act elim-
inated any dissemination of security bulletins to the pub-
lic. The desire of the "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103" was
that exactly the opposite would occur. 159 Section 207 of
the proposed Aviation Security Act did provide that the
in-flight security coordinator be briefed on matters relat-
ing to "any conditions that pose a potential threat."' 160
The issue of whether passengers themselves should be ad-
vised of security concerns remained unaddressed, how-
ever. In early 1989, the FAA met with the major airlines'
security managers and advised them that the policy of the
government was that threats should typically not be
publicized. 161
The "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103" take the position
that until the FAA accepts full accountability for airport
and airline security and actively participates in protecting
the public, the public should be allowed to protect them-
selves. The lack of information about the reasons behind
the bombing has engendered a distrust of the FAA and
the airline industry among members of the group. Specu-
lation exists that Pan Am Flight 103 was a "sacrifice"
flight by the U.S. Government, meant to appease the
Iranians for the Iranian airbus tragedy earlier in 1988.
Anger runs high over the large voluntary reparations that
have been paid by the United States government to the
families of victims on that flight, while Pan Am's bereaved
are left to weave their way through the maze of the Ameri-
can litigation process. 16 2 Some even believe that the en-
tire Iranian airbus tragedy was a hoax, engineered by the
Iranian government to embarrass the United States. 63
151, Donohue, supra note 30 (statements of Mr. Hogan).
low Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 207.
16, Telephone interview with Q. Burgess, FAA Legislative Liaison, Washington
D.C. (Jan. 19, 1990); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 178-79.
'2 The U.S. Government released $250,000 in voluntary reparations for the
accidental bombing of the Iranian airbus. According to "Victims of Pan Am Flight
103," it also released frozen assets amounting to $387,000,000 and will possibly
release another $200,000,000 in future. See Donohue, supra note 30 (statements of
Ms. Tsairis); Wines, supra note 12, at BI.
-4 Id.
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Although from the safety of an armchair these ideas may
seem extreme, factual evidence does suggest that Pan Am
Flight 103 had more to do with international politics than
airport security. If this is true, it seems only logical to
question the government's ability to protect passengers
while simultaneously endangering them.
Those opposing the disclosure of bomb threats typi-
cally give several reasons why it is inadvisable to warn pas-
sengers. 164 First, not every bomb threat is specific as to its
targeted airport or airline carrier, let alone the date and
time of the planned attack. Also, threats are so numerous
that airlines receive more than one threat per day. 65 Sec-
ond, spurious hoax threats might increase if there is a
greater opportunity to create mass hysteria. Third, it is
questionable whether passengers can make an informed
decision on the basis of the limited and hurried informa-
tion given at the ticket counter. The facts of Pan Am
Flight 103 demonstrate that even the experts cannot
properly assess threats after two months of investigation.
One wonders, however, if passengers could do worse.
Some airlines fear an unnecessary decrease in business
will occur if passengers are advised of every security
threat. As fuel prices soar and competition stiffens, the
threat of a decrease in international air travel is an unsa-
vory thought to the airline industry. The "Victims of Pan
Am Flight 103" allege, however, that air travel is not likely
to decrease if passengers are notified of a bomb threat.
For example, in April of 1989, only seventeen of two hun-
dred ticketed passengers on a Pan Am flight between
Paris and the United States refused to board after being
informed of a potential bomb threat fifteen minutes
before departure. 66 On the other hand, only twenty-two
out of one hundred thirty ticketed passengers boarded af-
ter being advised by Northwest Airlines of a bomb threat
,c' MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour - Focus, supra note 99.
'," Id.; telephone interview with Q. Burgess, supra note 161.
'; MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour - Focus, supra note 99 (statements of Mr. Lehrer
and Mr. Ammerman).
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on its December 30, 1989, flight from Paris to Detroit
flight. 167
Basing a decision of whether public disclosure of bomb
threats is desirable solely by an analysis of the effect of
warnings on ticket sales ignores the other expenses in-
curred by the industry for each successful bombing.
Legal defense costs, manpower expenditures to deal with
the bereaved and the media, costly internal investigations,
and the time and money spent in public and governmen-
tal hearings all tip the scales heavily in favor of proactive
effort. Clearly, the potentially adverse economic impact
on ticket sales has not deterred some airlines from at-
tempting to pass some of the risk to the passenger. For
example, Delta Air Lines announced a general terrorist
threat against its transatlantic flights in January of
1990.168
The FAA has expressed concern that even warnings re-
stricted to passengers will create mass panic at airports,
especially once news of the bomb threat leaks to the me-
dia. Admittedly, passenger warnings could lead to practi-
cal and administrative problems. These problems are not
insurmountable, however. Perhaps the real fear of both
industry and government is that the public will find out
how unfriendly the skies really are. Public disclosure that
neither the fare paid to the airline nor the Trust Fund fee
levied on each ticket has effectively improved security
would be, at best an embarrassment.
With the existence of groups such as the "Victims of
Pan Am Flight 103," it is futile to delay public involve-
ment in aviation security in the hope that the problem will
quietly disappear. Irrespective of the merits of such argu-
ments, it is unlikely that the public will accept "adminis-
trative convenience" as sufficient reason to preclude the
disclosure of bomb warnings. But because "administrative
inconvenience" ultimately translates into "administrative
167 Id.
16A Id.
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cost," it will be interesting to see if government policy will
actually change.
3. Fate of the Proposed Legislation: The Cost of Security
Although abundant support for new aviation security
measures existed, uncertainty plagued the fate of the Avi-
ation Security Act and the Airport Security Research and
Technology Act from their inception. Opposition to the
funding provisions existed on several fronts - specifically
in issue was the issue of the source of the $100,000 allo-
cated for the purchase of TNA devices.
a. The Trust Fund Dispute
The original drafts of the Aviation Security Act re-
quired the government to make funds directly available to
the airlines to cover their TNA device purchase and instal-
lation costs.' 6 9 The FAA opposed the bill arguing that
airports should upgrade security with their own funds,
and the Ways and Means Committee refused to authorize
grants to the airlines for that purpose. 70 The airlines ar-
gued that terrorist activities are directed towards govern-
ment decisions and policies, not air carriers, and that the
government must accept responsibility for at least some
of the financial burden. A corollary concern of all parties
was that additional security costs would further burden
the ability of United States carriers to compete interna-
tionally. Congressman Oberstar, the sponsor of the Avia-
tion Security Act and of the funding amendment, noted
that United States carriers already cover all domestic se-
curity costs, including the costs of training and equipment
for personnel at 1200 airport security checkpoints, and
the costs of air cargo and baggage inspection, airport ac-
cess systems, and secured area protection at airports.
Oberstar noted that, in contrast, all European govern-
"w, Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 101.
,711 Transportation - Aviation Security, CONG. Q WEEKLY REP. August 12, 1989, at
2110; see generally Warning Appended to Security Bill, CONG. Q WEEKLY REP., May 27,
1989, at 1251 (discussing legislative action on the Aviation Security Act).
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ments and the Israeli government provide security for
their air carriers, virtually eliminating these costs from the
overhead of foreign airline competition.' 7' Furthermore,
the Department of Transportation already required
United States airlines to bear the cost of TNA device
installation. 72
Supporters of the funding mechanism in the Aviation
Security Act noted that, as of 1989, a surplus of $5.8 bil-
lion had accumulated in the Trust Fund through the con-
tributions of the airline ticket purchasers. 73 They also
pointed to the immediate need for security measures, cit-
ing the fact that the aviation security system currently in
place was designed to combat the hijacking activities of
the 1970s and not the bombings of the late 1980s.174
Those objecting to the use of the Trust Fund as the
source of funds for TNA devices stated that it was unfair
for domestic travelers to pay for the security of interna-
tional travelers through a levy on their domestic tickets.175
The Secretary of Transportation went so far as to write a
letter indicating that, if the Aviation Security Act were en-
acted, he would strongly recommend that the President
veto the bill. 176 He reasoned that the legislation could ac-
tually slow the process of getting TNA online by encour-
aging the airlines to defer purchasing TNA devices until
government funds were appropriated. He referred to the
funding program as an "expensive precedent for a new
Federal subsidy at [sic] the airlines."' 177
The real crux of the matter seemed to be the reluctance
171 135 CONG. REC. H5679 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statements of Rep.
Oberstar).
172 Transportation - Aviation Security, CONG. Q WEEKLY REP. Dec. 2, 1989, at
3308.
,7. 135 CONG. REC. H5768 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statements of Rep. Ander-
son). The Trust Fund was projected to have accumulated a surplus of $7.6 billion
as ofJuly 1990. Pytte, supra note 101, at 2216.
174 135 CONG. REC. H5767 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statements of Rep.
Anderson).
,7. Id. at H5774 (statements of Rep. Delay).
17,;Id. (statements of Rep. Coughlin).
177 Id.
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of the FAA and some members of the Appropriations
Committee to expend Trust Fund moneys. 78 Those in
favor of allocating more of the Trust Fund for security
programs noted that Trust Fund moneys are actually fig-
ured into the government's budget to offset the federal
deficit.' 79 Congressman Smith pointedly summarized the
position of those in favor of spending the Trust Fund,
stating, "First and foremost, we are here to protect peo-
ple, not the trust fund. The trust fund is not going to get
bombed out of the sky."'' 8 0
Several other considerations may also have shaped the
opinions of those supporting Trust Fund spending. First,
the more funds that remained "Trust Funds," the greater
the amount of interest accumulating on those funds and
the greater the pool of money designated specifically for
aviation use. Second, the existence of a large Trust Fund
provided political saleability for aviation projects, includ-
ing aviation security. In other words, elected representa-
tives could point to the existence of this source of funds
when seeking support for an aviation program.
Because of continuing controversy, the bill was
amended to make funds available from the Trust Fund
but subject to the normal appropriation process.' 8 ' This
amendment dovetailed with the issuance of a final rule by
the FAA requiring air carriers to assume the full cost of
the equipment. 8 2 Under the amendment, the carriers
would initially pay for the equipment, but the government
would be obligated to buy back the devices at their origi-
nal purchase price, if and when the money became avail-
,78 Transportation - Aviation Security, supra note 170, at 2110.
,7. Pytte, supra note 101, at 2216; see Nutting, supra note 86, at 2052.
'g" 135 CONG. REC. H5774 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statements of Rep.
Smith). For comments relating to the use of the Trust Fund to mask the federal
deficit, see id. at H5780 (statements of Rep. Boehlert); see also Pytte, supra note
101, at 2216.
is, 135 CONG. REC. H5767 (daily ed., Sept. 20, 1989); see also Pytte, House OKs
Bomb Detector Bill With Funding Compromise CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Sept. 23, 1989,
at 2454.
182 135 CONG. REC. (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) at 5767 (statements of Rep.
Clinger); see also 14 C.F.R. § 108.7 (1990).
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able through the action of the Appropriations
Committee.1 3 Thereafter, the equipment would be made
available to the airports. Supporters endorsed this
amendment because it avoided the "dangerous prece-
dent" of authorizing direct grants to individual airlines' 8 4
and eliminated the "long, bureaucratic, Federal procure-
ment process."'185
A potential difficulty remained, however, in that the air-
lines could pass the cost of the TNA devices on to their
passengers, and then subsequently recover the purchase
costs from the government, amounting to a double recov-
ery from taxpaying passengers.18 6 An additional concern
was that money might eventually have to be taken from
other aviation programs to permit the future repurchasing
of TNA devices. 8 7 Thus, the FAA still preferred that the
airlines purchase their own explosive detection equip-
ment and then ultimately pass on the cost to the flying
public in the form of additional surcharges on airfares.
A jurisdictional issue was also hidden within the dispute
over whether Trust Funds should be used to purchase
TNA devices. Direct allocation under the statute would
bypass the Appropriations Committee and usurp its
spending jurisdiction. 88 The amendment to the Aviation
Security Act allowed for a compromise to be reached on
this issue. While the funding for TNA devices would be
subject to the 1990 appropriations process, the bill was
reworded to reflect Congressional consensus that the
TNA program should ultimately be financed out of the
Trust Fund. 89
Despite the legislative compromise, opposition to the
bill remained. Critics of the legislation continued to ex-
183 135 CONG. REc. H5770 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1990) (statements of Rep.
Clinger).
1.4 Id.
Id. at H5771 (statements of Rep. Conti).
... Pytte, supra note 101, at 2216.
187 Transportation - Aviation Security, supra note 170, at 2110.
188 See Pytte, supra note 101, at 2216.
181) Id.
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press concern over the use of the Trust Fund for the TNA
program. They argued the moneys would be taken away
from the purposes for which they were intended: capital
improvement projects such as airport expansions.' 90 In
the words of Congressman Hammerschmidt, "For every
dollar the federal government spends on security, there is
less for airport improvement."' 9'
The same concern over possible underfunding of capi-
tal improvement projects has plagued DOT appropriation
bills. To avoid the underfunding of capital improvement
projects, the bills once contained a "penalty clause." The
penalty clause automatically reduced the money available
for appropriation from the Trust Fund for FAA opera-
tions whenever the appropriations for capital improve-
ment projects fell below required amounts. 192 In such
instances, the Trust Funds available for FAA operations
were to be reduced by a sum twice the amount capital im-
provement projects were underfunded. Despite the pen-
alty clause, sums less than those required for capital
improvement projects still gained approval, consequently
limiting the FAA's operational funding from the Trust
Fund account. Therefore, the latest DOT appropriations
bill eliminated the penalty clause. 93 Instead, airport de-
velopment and planning grants have been increased, and
the Trust Fund will now contribute a greater share of the
FAA's operational costs. 94
Neither the use of a penalty clause nor the solution
used with the 1991 appropriation bill solve the fundamen-
tal problem underlying the Trust Fund dispute, which is
-o Section Notes: Ways and Means Rejects Aviation Security Plan , CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP., June 10, 1989, at 1399; Transportation - Aviation Security, supra note 170, at
2110; Transportation - Aviation Security, supra note 172, at 3308; Pytte, supra note
181, at 2454.
'-' Pytte, supra note 181, at 2454.
1'2 Pytte, supra note 101, at 2216.
-3 H.R. 5229, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. REP. No. 584, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990); S. REP. No. 398, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990); see also Pytte, supra
note 101, at 2216; Pytte, Transportation Panel Drafts $13.1 Billion Spending Bill,
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., June 23, 1990, at 1952.
194 Pytte, supra note 101, at 2216.
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simply the existence of a limited amount of resources for
a potentially unlimited amount of projects. A fact compli-
cating the funding dispute is that while the Trust Fund
has been accumulating a "surplus," the federal general
revenues have simultaneously been used to finance FAA
operations. 95 Since 1982, public works legislation has re-
portedly appropriated $5.3 billion from general revenues
for FAA operations.' 96 Thus, it is arguable that the in-
crease in the Trust Fund has actually been offset by a cor-
responding decrease in general revenues.
The funding dispute takes on an aura of unreality con-
sidering that, ultimately, both the Trust Fund and the
general revenues exist only on paper. By way of simple
explanation, if the FAA is limited to a defined budget, any
Trust Fund money allocated to aviation security programs
will mean less Trust Fund money remaining for capital
improvement projects. Thus, these projects will require
greater allocations from federal general revenues. The
"spending down"'' 97 of the Trust Fund will also mean less
of an offset against the federal deficit. In other words, a
higher federal deficit will be reflected in the government
ledgers. The greater the federal deficit, the smaller the
amount of general revenues available to all competing ad-
ministrative agencies, including the FAA. The smaller the
amount of funding to the FAA from the general revenues,
the less funds available for capital improvement projects.
The converse is also true: limiting expenditures from the
Trust Fund to capital improvement projects will leave avi-
ation security programs underfunded.
One possible solution to this conundrum is spending
Trust Fund money, yet simultaneously continuing to draw
on general revenues. This solution would allow the fund-
--, Telephone interview with Joan Bauerlein, Director of Aviation, FAA, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Sept. 7, 1990); Pytte, supra note 101, at 2216.
11"1 Pytte, supra note 101, at 2216.
,1,7 "Spending down" is defined as spending at a greater rate than the rate at
which incoming revenues accumulate, with the result that the fund is gradually
reduced. In layman's terms, it amounts to speeding up the rate at which one falls
behind.
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ing of both capital improvement projects and aviation se-
curity, but likewise would increase the federal deficit from
both ends - a politically and economically unpalatable al-
ternative. Perhaps the reality of this "Catch 22" is what
spurred Congressman Oberstar, sponsor of the proposed
Aviation Security Act and originally a proponent of
spending down the Trust Fund, to redirect his support to
the Bush administration's latest alternative: user fees.1 98
Stating the obvious, Congressman Oberstar noted that
"we all know that there is no free lunch."' 99
b. User Fees
On March 19, 1990, the Bush administration proposed
a five-year plan for the financing of commercial aviation
programs, partially utilizing user fees as a funding
method.2 0 0  The House bill for this Airport and Airway
Trust Fund reauthorization was passed on August 2,
1990.201 The companion bill20 2 remains opposed in the
Senate, and markup of that bill is unlikely in 1990.20
The reauthorization plan provides for aviation funding
through a combination of increased taxes on cargo, fuel,
and airline tickets, and by the imposition of an airport tax,
referred to as a "passenger facility charge" (PFC).2 4 A
PFC of up to $12 per round trip ticket will permit airports
11 There are also political realities which may contribute to these shifts in posi-
tion. For further speculation on this point, see Mills, House OKs Passenger Fees to
Boost Airport Funding, CONG . WEEKLY REP., Aug. 4, 1990, at 2510, 2511.
it, Nutting, supra note 86, at 2052.
2- H.R. 5170, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
'0 The House Public Works Committee approved the bill 37 to 10 on June 28,
1990 (the same day the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 was intro-
duced), Nutting, supra note 86, at 2052. The House vote on August 2, 1990 was
405 to 15. Mills, supra note 198, at 2510; H.R. 5170, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990);
see also H.R. REP. No. 581, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
202 S. 2268, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
201 Legislative Summaries, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Aug. 18, 1990, at 2659.
21,4 Pytte, Bush Plan for Airports, FAA Depends on Higher Taxes, CONG Q. WEEKLY
REP., Mar. 24, 1990, at 912. The plan increases federal airline ticket taxes from
eight percent to ten percent; freight fees from five percent to six percent; aviation
gasoline taxes from twelve cents per gallon to fifteen cents per gallon; and jet fuel
taxes from fourteen cents per gallon to eighteen cents per gallon. Id.
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to generate funds for their own capital improvement
projects.2 0 5 The plan calls for a corresponding decrease
in federal funding for airports of fifty cents for each dollar
collected as a PFC. Assuming that the largest forty-five
domestic airports will levy PFCs, an estimated $1 billion
annually in additional funds for airport development is
anticipated.20 6 In accordance with the DOT's proposals
to "spend down" the Trust Fund, the administration's
plan also proposes to reduce the overall balance in the
Trust Fund to $3 billion by fiscal year 1995.207 With the
spending down of the Trust Fund, a smaller percentage of
general revenues is to be made available for FAA
operations. °8
Critics of the plan object to the imposition of user fees
prior to the reduction of the Trust Fund "surplus. 2 0 9
The reductions to the Trust Fund contemplated in the
plan have also been criticized as being too slow and "un-
realistic in light of other transportation cuts" in other sec-
tors. 10 There is a fear that funds otherwise directed to
FAA operations may be required for other transportation
projects that are inadequately financed, increasing the
possibility that funds may ultimately be directed away
from aviation related capital improvement projects.2 l
The bill included a clause that provided for repeal of
PFCs if federal airport improvement spending dropped
below $3.7 billion over fiscal 1991-92. This clause ad-
dressed the concern that the increased income generated
from PFC's would be used to reduce expenditures from
the Trust Fund rather than to pay for airport
' " Mills, supra note 198, at 2510. A PFC will be $1, $2, or $3 per ticket with a
maximum of two fees on any one-way trip. Id.
206 Nutting, supra note 86, at 2052; Mills, supra note 198, at 2510.
217 Pytte, supra note 204, at 912. For a further discussion of "spending down,"
see supra note 197.
21"' Pytte, supra note 204, at 912.
21M Id.
21 Id.
21 The Appropriation Subcommittee on Transportation received 497 requests
for specific projects in fiscal 1991 from 85 Senators. Transportation Bill Passed by
Senate, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Aug. 11, 1990, at 2592.
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improvements.22
What does all of this mean for aviation security? As the
debate over aviation funding expands into the realm of
DOT budgets and appropriations, it becomes easy to lose
sight of the importance of financially supporting the small
component of aviation security. As time passes, improv-
ing aviation security may appear less urgent, lulling us
into complacently preserving the status quo. Frustrations
over lineups at airports may begin to seem more impor-
tant than costly security procedures as the tragedy at
Lockerbie fades into an unpleasant memory.
c. "Pay-As-You-Fly" Security and (Low Cost) Public
Awareness
Despite their dulling effect on the improvement of avia-
tion security, economic realities cannot be ignored. Are
there other alternatives to those that the policy-makers
and legislators have introduced thus far? One editorial
on the subject suggests a more radical alternative to avia-
tion security funding. The editorial suggests allowing
market forces to dictate completely the levels of safety and
security.2 13 In other words, travelers should themselves
choose how much security they wish to have by paying
more for less crowded flights, safer aircraft (beyond a
minimum standard), and better security. In order to make
this work, the editorial notes that all aviation crashes must
be fully investigated, and the results of the investigations
must be made public.
This "Russian roulette" approach to aviation security
seems rather naive. It implies that airline passengers will
have a real choice as to the quality of security they wish to
obtain. In reality, however, the question will not be "how
much security would you like?", but "how much security
can you afford?" In some cases, the government, for rea-
sons of "national security" (or perhaps embarrassment)
212 Nutting, supra note 86, at 2052.
2 , Enjoy Your Flight: Air Crashes are Memorably Horrific, but (Still) Fantastically Rare,
THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1989, at 17.
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may not want the public to be apprised of the results of
aviation crash investigations. Furthermore, there are no
guarantees that public disclosure of the results of those
investigations will be accurate, complete, 4 or timely.
Furthermore, in an industry where certain routes become
"captive markets" for the airlines, there is no way for the
consumer to comparatively shop the market. It also is im-
possible to ensure a correlation between the cost of a
ticket and the security provided. On Pan Am Flight 103,
passengers paid an additional $5 per ticket for what Pan
Am advertised as the best security in the industry.21 5 The
results are poignantly clear.
Perhaps the most valuable part of the "pay-as-you-fly"
security idea is its call for increased public awareness. Se-
curity and safety do vary among airlines, and it is up to the
consumer to demand some level of security and safety, or
at least some information, in exchange for the price of an
airline ticket. Perhaps this is also part of the solution to
the current miring of aviation security legislation in dis-
putes over the Trust Fund.
Is raising public awareness too cumbersome and slow a
process to be a realistic alternative? Even if the Aviation
Security Act had become law, in practice it may have done
no more than formally acknowledge the need for an effec-
tive security system. The proposed bill merely required
the content of security programs to be studied. Although,
during early 1990, the FAA promulgated its own rules re-
lating to security,21 6 the pending bill did not contain firm
deadlines within which the FAA would be required to pro-
214 Some members of "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103" believe the flight may
have been involved in a CIA effort to free hostages in exchange for drugs being
couriered to the United States. In fact, a substantial quantity of heroin was found
on the flight. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 79. If this is true, it is unlikely that the
government would disclose it. See telephone interview with Georgia Nucci, supra
note 14.
21' MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour - Focus, supra note 99; Donohue, supra note 30
(statements of Barbara Zinnenberg).
---;Mills, Federal Officials Report Progress On Commission's Recommendations, AIR
SAFETY WEEK, July 30, 1990, at 3.
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duce new security regulations7
We can only speculate as to how effective or ineffective
the Aviation Security Act would have been, and whether it
has had any effect in shaping FAA policy. For now, it
gathers dust with ATRA on the shelves of the Senate
Commerce Committee. Fortunately, however, new op-
portunity to improve aviation security now exists in the
form of the proposed Aviation Security Act of 1990.28
C. Post-1989 Initiatives
1. The President's Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism
On August 4, 1989, the bipartisan President's Commis-
sion on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Commission)
was established, 1 9 largely in response to the lobbying ef-
forts of the "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103." The Com-
mission's purpose was "to review and evaluate policy
options in connection with aviation security, with particu-
lar reference to the destruction on December 21, 1988, of
Pan American World Airways Flight 103. ' 2 ° Subsection
2(b) required the seven-member Commission 22 1 to "con-
duct a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and
policy options with respect to terrorist acts involving avia-
tion," including the evaluation of "the adequacy of ex-
isting procedures for aviation security, compliance
therewith, and enforcement thereof." The Commission
was required to make a submission to the President within
six months.22 By executive order,2 the deadline for the
2" See Aviation Security Act, supra note 1; Airport Technology and Research
Act, supra note 1.
218 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1; Aviation Security
Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1.
2 19 Exec. Order No. 12,686, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,629 (1989).
220 Id.
22, The Commission included Chairwoman McLaughlin and six other members:
Senators D'Amato and Lautenberg, Congressmen Oberstar and Hammerschmidt,
retired USAF General Richards, and Mr. Hidalgo, an attorney. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
222 Exec. Order No. 12,686, supra note 219, § 2(b).
22 .1 Exec. Order No. 12,705, 55 Fed. Reg. 8,113 (1990).
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report was extended, and on May 15, 1990, the Commis-
sion presented its report to the President.,
The 182-page Report is highly critical of every aspect of
the existing aviation security system, calling it "seriously
flawed. ' 22 4 In Senator Lautenberg's words: "As with
other team efforts, an aviation security system is only as
strong as its weakest link. When we on the Commission.
looked at the existing system, we found a chain with weak-
nesses at virtually every link."212 5 The Report describes
the FAA as a "reactive" agency that failed to enforce its
own safety regulations. 226 Disturbingly, some of the inad-
equate security procedures followed by Pan Am and weak-
nesses within the security system that contributed to the
Pan Am Flight 103 disaster were found to still exist at the
date of the Report.227
The report provides a comprehensive overview of both
the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster and the aviation security
system in general. It contains sixty-four recommenda-
tions which can be grouped into the following seven areas
of reform: administrative reorganization within the gov-
ernment, research and development, security procedure
reform, coordinated intelligence and improved security
bulletin process, public notification of security threats, im-
proved crisis response and compensation, and increased
national will against terrorism.
a. Administrative Reorganization
One of the key problems with the aviation security sys-
tem highlighted by the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster is the
lack of coordination and communication between the
State department, the FAA, and the American intelligence
gathering community. Both a duplication of effort and a
• President's Commission Faults Pan Am, Government For Flight 103 Bombing, Makes
60 Recommendations, AIR SAFETY WEEK, May 21, 1990, at 1.
2 136 CONG. REC. S.9202 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statements of Sen.
Lautenberg).
226 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 63; see also President's Commission
Faults Pan Am, supra note 224, at 1.
227 President's Commission Faults Pan Am, supra note 224, at 1.
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lack of accountability existed within the system .2 2  The
group responsible for civil aviation security did not have
any formal organizational link with the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and likewise, DOT had no formal
means of requiring accountability.
The Commission endorses several organizational
changes, the two most notable being the Transportation
Secretary's appointment of an Assistant Secretary for Avi-
ation Security and Intelligence within the DOT and the
requirement that the executive heading the FAA aviation
security operational function report directly to the FAA
Administrator. 229 The Commission also suggested mov-
ing the FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security to the DOT
and having that office report to the Assistant Secretary for
Aviation Security and IntelligenceY3 0 To strengthen com-
munication between the DOT and the intelligence com-
munity, the Report indicates that one or more intelligence
agents from the CIA or another appropriate agency
should serve in a senior capacity at the Office of the Secre-
tary in the DOT.2 3
The Commission also recommends that, with respect to
security issues, the lead negotiating role at the interna-
tional level should shift from the airline carriers to the
State Department, with the DOT playing a strong sup-
porting role.23 2 To this end, the Commission recom-
mends the creation of a Coordinator for International
Aviation Security, having an ambassador's rank.2 "
b. Research and Development
The Commission appears to deemphasize TNA as the
228 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 57.
2211 136 CONG. REC. S.9202 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statements of Sen.
Lautenberg); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 59.
•2.o PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
23 136 CONG. REC. S9202 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statements of Sen.
Lautenberg); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
2.2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 81, 82.
I2 ld. at 82.
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primary means of counteracting terrorism, 23 4 noting sev-
eral alternative technologies with promise, such as new
electromagnetic technologies, vapor-detection devices,
and atmospheric-pressure chambers for air cargo.23 5 The
Report calls for a "more focused and higher profile" re-
search and development program, 2 6 recommending the
FAA undertake a "vigorous effort to marshal the neces-
sary expertise to develop and test effective explosive-de-
tection systems. ' 23 7 The FAA is directed to "think ahead
and anticipate how to counter the next generation of ter-
rorist weapons, ' 238 and to give higher priority and more
federal funds to research and development.2 3 9 The Com-
mission expressed a preference for "multiple ap-
proaches" in improving security technology, including
researching methods to minimize airframe damage caused
by small amounts of explosives.240
c. Airport Security Procedure Reform
The Report enumerates a plethora of problems with se-
curity procedures, noting that the FAA's security regula-
tions "primarily set performance standards but do not
prescribe how these standards should be met."' 24' The
Report recommends better training of airport security
employees and government security inspectors, and the
development of appropriate security plans specific to each
airport.242 Because of the division in responsibility be-
tween airport operators and airline carriers, the FAA
plays crucial role in developing security policies, assessing
their effectiveness, and enforcing them consistently. The
Report calls for an on-site security manager at each high
2.14 Id. at 66.
2.-1 Id. at 64.
2.16 136 CONG. REC. S9202 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statements of Sen.
Lautenberg).
217 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6 at 66.
2" Id. at 67.
2110 Id. at 66.
240 Id.
I2 d. at 56.
2 Id. at 56, 58, 60.
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risk airport, whose function is to promote communication
and coordinated effort between the airport operator and
airline carriers, to ensure on-site familiarity with the air-
port security plan, and to facilitate consistent enforce-
ment of security regulations.243
Presently, no uniform international security system ex-
ists, and countries vary in their technical capabilities, fi-
nancial resources and priorities, and in their approaches
to aviation security. 244 Therefore, the Commission rec-
ommends that security objectives with foreign govern-
ments be reached through bilateral and multilateral
agreements, and through the use of the Foreign Airport
Security Act and the Foreign Airport Assessment pro-
gram. 245 The Foreign Airport Assessment Program pro-
vides for periodic security assessments of foreign airports
used by American carriers, measured against ICAO
standards .246
In addition to proposing a greater presence in foreign
airports to help resolve security-related problems and
correct system weaknesses,247 the Report also recom-
mends that sanctions be imposed against a foreign airport
when it fails to meet minimum security standards set by
ICAO, after a ninety day notice period. The suggested
sanctions include mandatory issuance of a travel advisory
in passenger tickets, printed notice in the Federal Regis-
ter together with public advertisement, possible suspen-
sion of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961248 and the Arms Export Control Act,2 49 and suspen-
sion of American air service to the airport by the Trans-
portation Secretary.2 50 These sanctions have considerably
more impact than mere publication in the Federal Regis-
243 Id. at 57, 60.
244 Id. at 27, 28.
245 Id. at 28, 39, 40.
246 Id. at 28.
247 Id. at 56.
248 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988).
... 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1988).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.
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ter, as was provided in the Aviation Security Act of
1989.251
d. Coordinated Intelligence and Security Bulletins
While the Commission is generally satisfied with the
government's coordination of intelligence activities di-
rected at terrorism, it did find areas where "communica-
tion and cooperation can be improved. 2 52 Aside from
the organizational changes it recommends, 5 3 the Com-
mission calls for a greater emphasis on long-term strate-
gic thinking and anticipation of future terrorist actions
instead of mere operational reaction to such activities. 54
An analysis of the process for "receipt, assessment and
dissemination of intelligence/threat information" is con-
tained in the Report, and the FAA's new policy initiative
to distinguish between "security directives" and "infor-
mation circulars" is lauded as a "significant improve-
ment." Security directives, issued for more serious or
time-sensitive threats, require immediate, mandatory ac-
tion by affected airlines. Airlines are required to develop
written procedures for responding to security directives
and must acknowledge receipt of the directives and report
actions on them.255 The Commission notes, however, that
airlines "still complain that the information they receive
from the FAA is too vague and general to be of much
value to them," perhaps due to the need to "sanitize"
classified information before distribution to the private
sector.256 It seems ironic that information gathered for
the purpose of protecting the public is then withheld from
the public "for its own good."
251 Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, § 105. For a discussion of screening and
airport security programs under proposed 1989 legislation, see supra notes 112-
130 and accompanying text.
2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 80.
25-1 For a discussion of administrative reorganization, see supra notes 228-233
and accompanying text.
254 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 81.
•5 Id. at 76-79.
2-56 Id. at 79.
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Rejecting the airlines' suggestion that senior airline of-
ficials be given security clearance, the Commission prefers
increasing the federal security role at airports.25 7 Presum-
ably, this preference is based on a desire to maintain a
close connection between the intelligence-gathering com-
munity and the FAA. This policy, however, maintains
both airline and public dependence on the decision-mak-
ing capabilities of the government. Because the airlines,
their insurers, and the public are those most affected by
those decisions, it is crucial to have greater accountability
by government to these parties. This greater accountabil-
ity might be achieved through more liberal policies for
public notification of security threats.
e. Public Notification of Bomb Threats
While the FAA has consistently taken the position that
it is impractical or impossible to warn the public of threats
against aviation, 5 8 the Report does not wholly discount
this idea. The Commission notes that "the question of
when and whether to notify the public of threats of this
sort cannot be translated into a mechanical or litmus pa-
per test. The issues are too complex and the variables too
case specific. ' 2 59 Based on its findings that the present
system is vulnerable and there are few specific threats, the
Commission agrees with public notification when "[t]he
threat information is credible, has enough specificity for
travelers to act but not enough specificity to tailor special
interdiction efforts; and there is a low level of confidence
that the threat of plastic explosives can be countered. 260
The FAA's policy has been to recommend air carriers
cancel threatened flights, rather than provide public no-
tice of the threats. The Commission, however, finds this
to be an "unreasonable alternative. ' 26 1 The Commission
257 Id.
258 Id. at 86-88, 178, 179.
259 Id. at 90.
2- Id. at 92.
261 Id. at 87. The Commission notes, "The cost and disruption to the airline
passengers of cancellations of flights will presumably be much higher than the
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recommends that primary responsibility over notification
rest with the government to ensure that a single, consis-
tent standard is applied in decision-making.2 62 Domesti-
cally, the Department of Justice, working with the FBI and
coordinating its decisions with the FAA and the DOT,
would make the assessment. Notification of threats to
flights abroad would be coordinated by the State Depart-
ment. Airlines would still be free to notify individual pas-
sengers, provided the information is unclassified. The
Commission does not rule out broad-scale public notifica-
tion, noting that, in some cases, it may be more appropri-
ate than merely notifying individual passengers at the
gate.263
Although the Commission's recommendations gener-
ally endorse passenger notification, practical difficulties
remain in determining which threats are credible, and the
best means of dealing with them. The effectiveness of
public notification will ultimately depend on whether the
State Department, the Department ofJustice, intelligence-
gathering agencies, and the FAA can join forces to de-
velop a workable notification process. Inevitably, and
perhaps unavoidably, the public will continue to rely
heavily on the decisions of government officials.
f. Crisis Response and Compensation
The Commission is highly critical of the manner in
which the State Department and Pan Am handled the af-
termath of Pan Am Flight 103. The Report contains a
long list of practical methods of improving crisis re-
sponse. Emergency telephone lines, on-site assistance for
the bereaved, "crisis teams" to coordinate response in
foreign locations, and training programs to sensitize State
Department staff to the needs of the bereaved are in-
costs associated with public notification, a much more reasonable'and more realis-
tic solution." Id. at 92.
262 Id.
201. Id ac 93.
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cluded. 2 ' The Commission also recommends that the
State Department obtain the airline's passenger manifest
in order to identify passengers and notify the families of
victims. 265 To eliminate overlapping services and to en-
sure that there is not a lack of response due to confusion
over the appropriate party to provide information and
assistance, the State Department is given primary respon-
sibility over crisis response management. 66
No domestic laws provide for financial compensation of
air crash victims or their families, and internationally, the
Warsaw Convention provides only limited relief.267 In ad-
dition to the ratification of amendments to the Warsaw
Convention discussed earlier in this paper,268 the Com-
mission recommends legislation establishing a permanent
fund to provide monetary benefits and tax relief for
American victims of terrorism.269
g. National Will Against Terrorism
The Commission recommends a policy of "zero toler-
ance" towards terrorism, and it rejects the previous reac-
tive "law enforcement" approach to the problem. 270 The
Report acknowledges that terrorism has become state-
sponsored in recent decades, and that acts of terrorism
against citizens are acts of aggression against their na-
-"' Id. at 124.
", Id. at 123. In the Pan Am Flight 103 case, it took Pan Am two days to pro-
duce a complete passenger manifest to the State Department, and Pan Am han-
dled the initial death notifications and provided follow-up information and
services. In its Report the Commission noted, "Failure to secure the manifest
promptly had a negative ripple effect on the State Department's image in subse-
quent activities. Thereafter, the Department appeared to lack control or authority
over who should notify next of kin, an accurate list of next of kin, and communica-
tion with the families." Id. at 99, 100, 123; see also telephone interview with Geor-
gia Nucci, supra note 14.
266 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 100-102.
.2-' For a discussion of the limitations on relief provided under the Warsaw Con-
vention, see supra notes 34-66 and accompanying text.
2- For a discussion of changes recommended for the Warsaw Convention, see
supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
2611 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, Supra note 6, at 105-107.
270 Id. at 115.
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tions. 7 1 Consequently, the Report calls on the American
public to support a consistent, aggressive policy against
terrorism. It also notes that despite improved technology,
training practices and security procedures, security in the
air cannot be guaranteed.272
The recommended responses to terrorist attacks in-
clude "planning training and equiping for direct pre-emp-
tive or retaliatory military actions against known terrorist
hideouts in countries that sanction them, ' ' 273 and pre-
emptive or disruptive covert operations where direct
strikes are unwise or inappropriate. It is also recom-
mended that greater international cooperation be utilized
to counteract terrorism through improved intelligence-
gathering, as well as political, economic, and military isa-
lation of countries guilty of fostering terrorism.274
A contradiction exists in the Commission's proposal
that we depart from a "law enforcement" approach, and
abandon the "idea of holding ourselves in all cases to a
criminal standard of proof before we act."'2 75 The same
problem exists with the use of "covert operations." The
fact that "terrorists, however, have relied upon the adher-
ence by others to these values [covert operations] to per-
mit them to attack thousands of innocent victims with
impunity' 276 is no justification for preemptive action.
Our adherence to fundamental legal principles, such as
the belief that people are innocent until proven guilty and
that people should be free from unreasonable search and
seizure without probable cause, distinguishes the Ameri-
can system from that of tyrants and terrorists. By re-
jecting legal process, we move closer in philosophy to the
terrorist, thereby failing those countries who still look to
the United States as a place where justice prevails over
political expedience.
271 Id.
27, Id. at 114.
27-1 Id. at I15.
274 Id. at 115-16.
2" Id. at 115.
276 Id.
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The United States must be prepared to abide by the
same standards it imposes on other nations. Only if the
United States is certain that its policies and actions are
free of state-sponsored vice can the government safely en-
dorse pre-emptive military strikes. Given the speculation
surrounding the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster, and the fail-
ure of both the State department and the intelligence
agencies to accurately assess terrorist threats, one is left
with serious reservations about supporting first strikes at
"known terrorist hideouts. ' 7 7 While decisive action is
certainly appropriate, the recommendations with the least
long-term fallout are those calling for cooperative effort
between nations. In this regard, the current events in Ku-
wait may prove to be instructive.
2. The Proposed Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990
On June 28, 1990, the House and Senate introduced
companion bills, each entitled the "Aviation Security Im-
provement Act."' 278 The bills codify many of the recom-
mendations of the President's Commission on Aviation
Security and Terrorism.2 79 The Senate bill was referred
to the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion, and the House bill was referred jointly to the Com-
mittee on Public Works and Transportation and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. 80
On July 26, 1990, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
and the Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee on Pub-
lic Works and Transportation held a joint hearing.28' A
large part of the discussions at the joint hearing related to
means of implementing the administrative reorganization
277 Id.
278 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, and Aviation Secur-
ity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1.
279 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6.
2-, House Aviation Security Act, supra note 1, and Aviation Security Improve-
ment Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1.
2. Transcripts of this hearing were not published as of mid-September, 1990.
Telephone interview with T. Greco, Professional Staff for House Committee on
Public Works and Transportation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 6, 1990) [hereinafter
Greco interview, Sept. 6].
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recommendations of the Commission.28 2 An amended
House bill was then substituted for the bill originally in-
troduced.28 3 The substitute bill incorporated three sub-
stantive changes.2 4 First, the bill deleted an earlier
provision requiring air carrier screening of mail cargo,
giving the FAA an opportunity to further investigate the
legal and practical implications.28 5 Second, the appoint-
ment of an assistant Secretary for Aviation Security and
Intelligence for a term of five years was amended to pro-
vide for an undefined term, at the discretion of the Trans-
portation Secretary.28 6 Third, because of the complaints
by air carriers that the delays and expense of increasing
their security practices would place them at a disadvan-
tage in the international market, the House added a sec-
tion requiring foreign air carriers to offer the same level
of protection to passengers as American carriers.28 7
The first Aviation Subcommittee markup of the House
Bill occurred on September 13, 1990. No substantive
changes were made at that time. 288 Discussions at the Avi-
ation Subcommittee level focused on organizational
changes and practical details in implementing the Com-
282 Telephone interview with C. Gable, Professional Staff for House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 6, 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Gable interview, Sept. 6].
2- As of Sept. 19, 1990, the substituted House bill was not available from the
Document Room. Author's copy obtained courtesy of T. Greco, Professional Staff
for House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Washington, D.C.
214 Telephone interview with C. Gable, Professional Staff for House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 18, 1990) [herein-
after Gable interview, Sept. 18]; Gable interview, Sept. 6, supra note 282.
28.1 See Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 111; Aviation Secur-
ity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 13.
2"8 See House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, §§ 101, 102.
This is "standard" for appointments of this type. Gable interview, Sept. 18, supra
note 284.
287 See House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 106. As 40%
of foreign air carrier passengers are American, it seemed logical that foreign carri-
ers should be required to maintain the same standards for security as that of
United States carriers. Gable interview, Sept. 18, supra note 284.
288 Telephone interview with T. Greco, Professional Staff for House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 18, 1990) [herein-
after Greco interview, Sept. 18]; Gable interview, Sept. 18, supra note 288.
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mission's recommendations.2 8 9 A full committee markup
of the substituted bill was held on September 19, 1990,
but no major substantive changes resulted.29 ° Once the
markup sessions were completed, the bill proceeded to
the House Floor. At the time of writing, the Foreign Af-
fairs Committee was hoping to move quickly on the bill.2 9 '
As of mid-September 1990, the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation was considering a
hearing on the Senate bill, in part to obtain input from the
"Victims of Pan Am Flight 103" on the proposed
legislation. 9 2
Both the Senate and the House bills reflect many of the
recommendations contained in the President's Commis-
sion Report, although there are some discrepancies be-
tween the two bills. The House bill supports the adoption
of Protocol 3 revisions to the Warsaw Convention 2 3 and
contains a general finding that the government "must
have the national will to take every feasible action to pre-
vent, counter and respond to terrorist activities. ' 294 The
Senate bill, in addition to a general finding supporting na-
tional will against terrorism, states that the United States
should politically, economically, and militarily isolate all
state sponsors of terrorism, and concludes that "active
measures are needed to counter more effectively the ter-
rorist threat. '2 95
2 Greco interview, Sept. 18, supra note 288; Gable interview, Sept. 18, supra
note 284.
2- Gable interview, Sept. 18, supra note 284. As of Sept. 19, 1990, the
amended bill from full committee markup was not available from House Docu-
ment Room. Author's copy courtesy of C. Gable.
291 Greco interview, Sept. 6, supra note 281; Greco interview, Sept. 18, supra
note 288.
292 Telephone interview with C. Carmody, Staff for Senate Commerce Commit-
tee, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 29, 1990).
293 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 2(6). For a dis-
cussion of reforms to the Warsaw Convention, see supra notes 49-56 and accom-
panying text.
'-' House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 2(11).
2115 Aviation Security Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1,
§ 2(10), (11).
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The following section is a brief review of the most sali-
ent features of the two bills.
a. Administrative Reorganization
The House bill provides for the appointment of an As-
sistant Secretary for Transportation Security and Intelli-
gence by the Executive branch and transfers responsibility
for strategy and planning of transportation security pol-
icy, as well as coordination with intelligence agencies, to
this office.296 Subsection 103(a) requires the Transporta-
tion Secretary to report annually to Congress on the sta-
tus of the implementation of the Commission's
recommendations.297 Section 104 of the House bill cre-
ates the position of Assistant Administrator of Civil Avia-
tion Security, reporting directly to the FAA
Administrator, and Section 105 provides for the place-
ment of Federal Security Managers at airports, who report
directly to the Assistant Administer of Civil Aviation Se-
curity. Federal Security Managers are to act as a liaison
between airport operators and air carriers in the develop-
ment of comprehensive security plans for their facili-
ties.298 They are also to receive intelligence information
relating to their airports and air carriers, and are to over-
see the enforcement of the FAA's security requirements
and coordinate local law enforcement efforts relating to
security at their facilities.
Whereas the House bill creates a new bureaucracy of
Foreign Security Liaison Officers at high risk foreign air-
ports,299 the Senate bill leaves Federal Security Managers
at foreign airports as the liaison with foreign security au-
thorities with regard to the implementation of FAA re-
quirements at those facilities. 0 0 Under the House bill,
Foreign Security Liaison Officers report directly to the As-
216 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, §§ 101, 102.
2... Id. § 103(a).
2189 Id. §§ 104, 105.
2' Id. § 105.
- Aviation Security Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 6.
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sistant Administrator of Civil Aviation Security.30'
b. Research and Development
Both the House and Senate bills call for accelerated and
expanded "research, development and implementation of
technologies and procedures to counteract terrorist acts
against civil aviation" and set a five-year time frame in
which the new equipment and procedures are to be in
place.30 2 The bills also provide for direct appropriations
from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund 30 3 of "such sums
as may be necessary. ' 30 4 Noteably the bills further
provide:
No deployment or purchase of any explosive detection
equipment.., shall be required ... unless the Administra-
tor certifies that, based on the results of tests . . . such
equipment ... can reliably detect the minimum amounts,
configurations, and types of explosive material which can
cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft with 60
or more passenger seats.30 5
Provisions endorsing TNA technology as the primary
means of ensuring security in the air are noticeably
absent.30 6
c. Security Procedures
Some of the new security procedures the FAA is author-
ized to introduce include investigations of air carrier and
airport personnel with unescorted access to aircraft or se-
cured areas of airports. 0 7 The investigations may include
so, House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 105.
1o02 Id. § 108; Aviation Security Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note
1, § 9.
o30 For a discussion of the Trust Fund, see supra notes 169-199 and accompany-
ing text.
3- Aviation Security Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 9.
505 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 109; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra 1, § 11.
3- House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 101. For a dis-
cussion of TNA under the bill, see supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
307 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 106; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 7.
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fingerprinting and a criminal history record check. The
results of the criminal history record check may be made
available to "persons designated by the Administra-
tor."308 Persons found to have committed certain felonies
within ten years of the investigation are ineligible for em-
ployment in those positions.3 0 9 The FAA is also required
to prescribe employment standards, including minimum
education, language skills, training, and staffing
requirements. l1
Ongoing analysis and monitoring of current and poten-
tial threats to both individual airports and the security of
the entire domestic air transportation system are to be
performed cooperatively by the FBI and FAA, with results
reported to Congress within one year.3 I Specific chan-
nels for reporting threats are also established. The
bills endorse improving foreign security through bilateral
agreements with foreign governments and the use of the
foreign airport assessment program under the Foreign
Airport Security Act.31 Provisions requiring the FAA to
develop "model standards for airport design and con-
struction to allow for maximum security enhancement"
are also included in the bills.3 4
d. Public Notification of Security Threats
Unlike the 1989 bills, the 1990 bills require the FAA to
." House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 106; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 7.
mx, House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 106; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 7. This type of regu-
lation by the FAA will certainly raise legal issues over privacy rights. The success
of those challenges is another issue.
"'1 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 106; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 7.
.- House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 107; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note I, § 8.
, 2 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 110; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 12.
-.1 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 201; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 29.
114 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 112; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 14.
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establish guidelines for determining if public notification
of a threat is prudent, ensuring that public notification is
timely and effective, and cancelling the departure of a
flight.3 1 5 The bills prohibit selective notification, unless
the threat applies only to specific travelers, but requires
the FAA, Secretary of State, Attorney General, intelli-
gence agencies, and law enforcement officials to "develop
procedures to minimize the number of individuals having
access to threat information. 3 1 6 The bill sets out the cri-
teria to be used in determining appropriate action. These
criteria include the specificity and severity of the threat,
the reliability of the information, the ability of those in-
formed to reduce the risk to their safety, and "other fac-
tors as the Administrator considers appropriate. 31 7
Selective use of the criteria could, in almost any case, ef-
", House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 110; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 12. The bills specifi-
cally provide for the following:
(1) determining, on a case-by-case basis, if public notification of a
threat is in the best interest of the United States and the travelling
public; (2) ensuring that public notification, when considered appro-
priate, is made in a timely and effective manner, including the use of
a toll-free telephone number; and (3) cancelling the departure of a
flight or series of flights [if it is determined the threat could be a
danger to the safety of the passengers and crew].
House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 12.
3- House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 110; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 12.
317 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 109 (House sub-
stituted bill unavailable as of Sept. 19, 1990 from the House Document Room.
Author's copy courtesy of T. Greco and C. Gable, Professional Staff for House
Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Washington, D.C.). Section 109
provides:
The guidelines developed ... shall provide for the consideration of
(1) the specificity of the threat;
(2) the severity of the threat;
(3) the reliability of intelligence information related to the threat;
(4) the ability to effectively counter the threat;
(5) the protection of intelligence information sources and methods;
(6) cancellation, by an air carrier or the Administrator, of a flight or
series of flights instead of public notification;
(7) the ability of passengers and crew to take steps to reduce the risk
to their safety as a result of any notification; and (8) such other fac-
tors as the Administrator considers appropriate.
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fectively eliminate public notification, and the blanket dis-
cretion given to the FAA Administrator pursuant to
subsection 109(8)318 removes the possibility of any re-
course by the public for the failure of the Administrator,
Secretary of State, or Attorney General to require public
notification. Thus, although the provision is intended to
require public notification in appropriate cases, it could ac-
tually be equally effective in prohibiting notification of the
public. Given this possibility, one wonders if the entire
provision would best be left out of the statute after all.
Following the list of criteria for determining appropri-
ate action, the bill vaguely provides, "[a]ny restrictions
adopted shall not diminish the ability of the Federal Gov-
ernment to effectively discharge its responsibilities relat-
ing to aviation security. ' '3 1 9  It would be a gross
understatement to suggest that the FAA will have diffi-
culty in drafting guidelines both meeting the criteria set
out in the legislation and fulfilling this latter proviso.
Both the Senate and House bills provide for the estab-
lishment of an electronic bulletin board accessible to the
general public and updated daily, containing security in-
formation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.3 20
e. Crisis Response and Compensation
Numerous sections in the bills contain measures to im-
prove crisis response. The legislation compels airlines to
produce passenger manifests for the State Department
within one hour of any request.3 2' Other provisions as-
sign a State Department liaison to the family of each avia-
tion disaster victim, establish a toll-free telephone line for
inquiries, and provide for the training of consular officers
in disaster management, and deployment most of crisis
H, Id.
.' House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 110; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 12.
s.2,, House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 213; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note I, § 27.
--' House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 203; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 19.
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teams to the disaster site. 2 2 The State Department is
made responsible for notifying the families of victims of
aviation disasters abroad, and for assisting them both in
the recovery of personal effects and in the disposition of
remains.32 3 The Secretary of State is also required to pre-
pare an assessment of the handling of the Pan Am Flight
103 disaster, and to devise and distribute guidelines for
future responses to comparable disasters to all foreign
embassy and consular posts.3 2 4
Finally, the bills require that a legislative proposal be
submitted to Congress within one year, authorizing mon-
etary and tax relief to compensate American citizens who
are victims of terrorism. 5
3. Response to "Post-1989" Initiatives
Only a week after the crash of Pan Am Flight 103, the
FAA promulgated an emergency rule strengthening se-
curity measures in the Middle East and Western Europe
through more careful scrutiny of passengers and baggage,
and requiring positive matching of passengers with their
luggage. 6 Computer controlled access systems at the
entrance of "secure" areas were made mandatory as of
January 8, 1989.327 By April 3, 1989, following an inter-
nal review of the security system, the DOT announced
further security measures.3 2 8 Those further measures in-
cluded a revised security bulletin process with two levels
of notice (Information Circulars and Security Direc-
322 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, §§ 205-207; Avia-
tion Security Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, §§ 21-23.
32s House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, §§ 204, 208; Avia-
tion Security Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, §§ 20, 24.
-124 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 209; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 25.
325 House Aviation Security Improvement Act, supra note 1, § 212; Aviation Se-
curity Improvement Senate Companion Bill, supra note 1, § 18.
26 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 175.
327 Id.
-28 Id. at 176.
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tives), 329 increased standards for x-ray and metal detec-
tion equipment, actual installation of two TNA devices,
approval for additional security specialists overseas, dis-
cussions with foreign security officials, establishment of
an Aviation Security Advisory Committee, increased liai-
son with intelligence-gathering agencies, and review of
airline compliance with the earlier emergency rule.33 °
The FAA had also compared 65 of 136 security programs
against ICAO standards pursuant to an FAA regulation
issued in March of 1989.73
Within two months of the May 15, 1990 release of the
Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Secur-
ity and Terrorism, the FAA and the State Department had
implemented two-thirds of the Report's sixty-four recom-
mendations. 32 In testimony before Congress, FAA Ad-
ministrator James B. Busey remarked, "To my knowledge,
this swift and supportive response by the executive branch
to a report by a presidential commission is unprecedented
.... So that there can be no doubt, we intend to breathe
life into [the] vast majority of the commission's
recommendations."3 3 3
The reaction of legislators to the Report has also been
swift and positive. Introducing the Senate bill that would
codify the Commission's recommendations on June 28,
1990, Senator Lautenberg expressed hope that the Senate
would "move ahead with a strong legislative package
before the end of this Congress. '3 34 In July 1990, the
sponsor of the House bill and Aviation Subcommittee
Chairman, Congressman Oberstar, optimistically noted,
"This bill is on a fast track. We expect it to be enacted
this year.1335
'1 Id. at 178. For a discussion of security bulletins, see supra notes 148-158 and
accompanying text.
.'s PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 178-182.
Id. at 180, 181.
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The FAA, however, is opposed to a legislative solution,
reasoning that this type of solution will curtail its flexibil-
ity in dealing with security threats. 336 The FAA's position
in this regard is not limited to aviation security; it gener-
ally opposes any legislation regulating its operations, pre-
ferring instead to set its own internal operational
standards in response to broad policy mandates of the
DOT." 7 While allowing the FAA a free hand in setting its
own standards is like asking a fox to guard the chicken
coop, the FAA's aversion to "legislative interference" has
some limited practical merit. As an executive agency, it
has technical and operational expertise that the legislative
branch may lack. Aviation security, by nature, is an area
that cannot be neatly packaged into well-defined policies.
Its parameters extend into a wide variety of government
functions, both domestic and foreign, with each security
incident having its own unique character and problems.
Limiting the FAA's operational flexibility and ability to
deal with emergencies on a case-by-case basis arguably
may eliminate its efficiency and effectiveness and waste
valuable time.
The inherent difficulty in rejecting legislative action,
however, is that no direct accountability then exists. How
important is formal accountability? The Commission
seems to think the lack of formal reporting lines between
the security function in the FAA and the DOT was a seri-
ous flaw in the system. 3 8 Certainly the "Victims of Pan
Am Flight 103" agree. The group was pleased with the
Commission's report, calling it a "vital first step on the
road to justice, ' 339 but clearly sees the Report as a fore-
runner to legislation. Upon release of the Report, a
spokesperson for the group stated, "[w]e commit our-
selves to redoubling our efforts to ensure that our govern-
'-- Id.
.17 Telephone interview with Joan Bauerlein, supra note 195.
"' PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 48, 59.
President's Commission Faults Pan Am, supra note 224, at 3.
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ment walks the entire distance. 3 40
Although demanding legislative reform is the typical re-
sponse of an outraged public, the underlying need is not
really "regulation" but "reform." Legislation no more
guarantees timely and appropriate action than does com-
plete freedom from accountability. It is not the black let-
ter of the law that will thwart terrorism or improve
security; terrorism already contravenes the laws of every
civilized nation, and security procedures already existed
on the date Pan Am Flight 103 was bombed.
The FAA may say its reform efforts are indicative of its
ability to act without legislative prompting. The legisla-
tors may argue that the initiatives have all occurred under
the threat of impending legislation. What really matters is
that change occurs - that all of us, from ambassadors to
baggage-handlers, and including airline passengers, take re-
sponsibility for our link in the security system chain. If
aviation security is to improve, cooperative action is
needed. What needs to be avoided are those policies and
people who refuse to allow others in the security system
to participate.
V. CONCLUSION
Law is a creature of society; it reflects the belief system
of its citizens. As much a chameleon as those it serves, it
evolves with human consciousness. The aviation law of
the past reflected society's desire to shield a new airline
industry while indemnifying passengers for losses associ-
ated with the hazards of modern technology. The indus-
try has since matured and the risks have expanded beyond
the realm of mechanical and operational defects. Having
shrunk the world for the traveling public, international
aviation has likewise created a new vehicle for political ex-
pression. Pan Am Flight 103 is a sad example of this de-
velopment. Students, young children, businessmen, and
families all shared in their ability to access the world and
340 Id
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in so doing, shared their fate at the hands of a terrorist
bomber.
Pan Am Flight 103 is clear in its commentary on. world
politics, but what does it tell us about our existing beliefs?
What does the way we order our responsibilities among
the public, government, and industry say about our val-
ues? Have we learned anything?
It is clear that we have outgrown the aviation laws of
yesteryear. The rationale behind the old Warsaw Con-
vention limitations on recovery no longer exist. It is time
that workable reforms to this treaty not just be seriously
considered, but adopted. It is equally clear that existing
aviation security practices are inadequate to protect the
American public from the threat of terrorists. Legislation
requiring tighter security controls at airports and more
coordinated effort within the government are certainly
part of the solution. The other part lies with us as individ-
uals. Not only do our American passports confer a bene-
fit, they carry a liability as well. When we venture outside
United States borders, it is no longer appropriate to ex-
pect our country to take care of us. On foreign soil, and
struggling under the economic constraints of the 1990s,
the American government is limited.
Certainly, government legislation has yet to provide a
comprehensive solution to our lack of security in the air.
Aside from the politics which hampered the initial legisla-
tive initiatives to improve security, the legislation itself
lacked any sense of immediacy. It required the FAA to
undertake certain studies, but specific proactive measures
were disappointingly absent. The importance of assessing
a need and of carefully setting a direction cannot be un-
derrated. However, as a variation of the old saying goes:
The flight path to Hell is vectored with good intentions.
It is interesting that the primary thrust of the earliest
legislation was geared to improving technology (TNA in
particular), and perfecting administrative processes (air-
port security programs and FAA security bulletins). Aside
from provisions requiring predeparture briefings of in-
1990] 485
486 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
flight security personnel and publication in obscure places
of rather useless information, the proposed legislation
contained only one provision which helped passengers to
protect themselves. Neither the government nor the air-
lines were required to inform passengers of bomb threats,
credible or otherwise. The legislation assumed that pas-
sengers were to rely on the FAA bulletin process, airport
security officials, and airline contractors and personnel for
their safety and security. As Pan Am flight 103 has al-
ready proven, this reliance on third party protection is
both outdated and dangerous.
The proposed Aviation Security Act of 1990 is a great
improvement over the earlier legislative initiatives. The
bills are encouraging in that they focus less on improving
technology and more on improving the communication
and coordination among the public, government, and in-
dustry players. At this time (October, 1990), the bills are
just beginning the markup phase and are still very vulner-
able to the politics of the day.
Although the introduction of legislation and the inter-
nal efforts of the FAA to improve aviation security proce-
dures are important first steps, tangible improvements in
aviation security have been undercut by administrative
scuffles over what should be the appropriate funding
source. The government is limited in its financial re-
sources, with the whole spectrum of government pro-
grams vying for the same funds. Thus, irrespective of the
efforts of benefic bureaucrats or black letter law, certain
programs will fail to garner political support and will
never be properly funded. Hopefully, the improved se-
curity system supported by the proposed Aviation Secur-
ity Improvement Act will not be one of them.
United States deficit financing will probably delay Sen-
ate approval of the funding source for new security pro-
grams for some time to come. If and when a source of
funds can be agreed upon, additional time will be re-
quired to get those funds formally allocated and available
for use. Further negotiation and number-shuffling will
[56
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then be needed to get the funds transformed into actual
dollars for security programs. From a technological per-
spective, aviation security is not likely to improve signifi-
cantly in 1991. Changes in security procedures and the
introduction of new programs will therefore depend upon
the initiatives of the FAA, the Department of Transporta-
tion, and the American intelligence-gathering community,
whom we can only hope will have the vision and foresight
to act cooperatively and proactively.
Even if an aviation security statute is enacted, it will not
guarantee better safety in the air. Future legislation will
be only as effective as the individuals who put its provi-
sions into practice. In the final analysis, while govern-
ment plays a role in the public welfare, it is no longer
prudent for the citizen to sit idly by, waiting to be taken
care of by Uncle Sam. For one thing, government may
not always have our best individual interests in mind when
it takes a position in international affairs. Terrorist bomb-
ings are a product of political tensions in which our gov-
ernment is an active participant. To rely solely on
government efforts, whatever they may be, is to abdicate
our responsibility for the risks we take to the party who
may be directly increasing the level of risk.
Surprisingly, none of the airlines, the President's Com-
mission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, the legisla-
tors, the FAA, nor the "Victims of Pan Am Flight 103"
have mentioned the development of a public awareness
program to help airline passengers become more respon-
sible for their own security. Public education - to in-
crease the level of passengers' vigilance for the care of
their luggage, promptness in getting to the airport well in
advance of their flights, patience with airport delays while
luggage is being screened, cooperation with and courtesy to-
wards airport personnel who work to ensure passenger
safety, and skepticism about the desirability of transporting
"gifts" for strangers - seems like a relatively expeditious
and inexpensive means of strengthening public support
for and confidence in the aviation security system. In
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making the public more responsible and aware, the air-
lines, the FAA, and legislators could also become more
visible as promoters of public welfare instead of ineffec-
tive, uninterested technocrats. That such a simple im-
provement could be overlooked seems to reflect our
penchant for "administrative caretaking" of the public.
Rather than creatively involving the public in the solution,
efforts continue to be directed to organizational
flowcharts, technology, and paternalistic regulation. Be-
cause airlines and their insurers feel the financial loss and
passenger dissatisfaction most directly when the security
system fails, perhaps they should consider leading the way
in developing and implementing a public awareness
program.
As passengers, it must be remembered that our per-
sonal safety is of greatest importance to us, not to an FAA
official or an airline security consultant. One need only
read the sections of this article dealing with the Trust
Fund allocation dispute, the December 1988, security bul-
letin process, or the examples of the treatment of the be-
reaved of Pan Am Flight 103, to question the wisdom in
blindly relying on the goodwill of industry or govern-
ment. If this seems too harsh a judgment, consider the
lives of those aboard Pan Am Flight 103. And if the
events of December 21, 1988, seem too remote and the
topic of aviation security seems too esoteric, then con-
sider a hypothetical:
International affairs in the Middle East have heated up.
Czechoslovakia, being preoccupied with Eastern Euro-
pean political and economical tensions, puts a low priority
on developing and mandating chemical markers for ex-
plosives it manufactures. International flights swell with
CIA operatives and sundry sordid terrorist types. The
time and energy of embassy personnel worldwide is thor-
oughly taxed, and it becomes increasingly difficult to as-
sess the multiplying number of threats and warnings. The
attention diverted to the political chaos in the Middle East
and the economic strife in Eastern European countries
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provides a perfect foil for a little known, but well-financed
radical political faction. At the ticketing booths, airline
agents impatiently converse with their computer termi-
nals, simultaneously ignoring the litany of superfluous
messages flashing upon their screens and addressing their
passengers, who complain loudly of the heat, crowding,
and departure delays. Tired, underpaid baggage inspec-
tion personnel halfheartedly screen random passengers.
A bomb with a new chemical make-up finds its way into
the cargo hold of a transoceanic flight. Another plane-
load of hapless souls never make it home.

